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Arab forces in Syria?

April 20, 2018 at 3:59 pm

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (L) and US President Donald Trump (R) in Hamburg, Germany, on 7 July 2017 [Russian Presidential Press and Information Office/Anadolu Agency]

When Donald Trump announced that he would be withdrawing from Syria and leaving it to others to take care of its affairs, the common belief was that by others he meant Russia and Iran. We also did not think he was leaving it to them as a gift, but as a punishment for them. This is because Trump’s announcement was made in the context of him talking about how the US lost $7 trillion in the Middle East, and therefore he expects Russia and Iran to have the same result.

There was no sign that Trump was referring to Arab countries when he mentioned “others”. It seems like this image formed recently after Gulf officials visited the American capital and met with Trump. It is clear that Trump was unable to propose his troops remain in Syria in the negotiations or no one paid him the asking price after realising that Trump asks for more than he gives and that he was turning politics, international relations and strategic interests into financial deals.

Perhaps what is most surprising about Trump’s proposal to form an Arab force and send it to Syria is the fact that Syria is now under the umbrella of a superpower, i.e. Russia, and that the division of areas of influence between Russia, Turkey and Iran has taken place in a complex and long-term manner. Therefore, it is difficult for regional countries who were not directly involved, by means of their agencies and forces to find a place for themselves on this map. Furthermore, it is much too late for such measures to take place as they are now too costly and beyond the capacity of the regional countries, if not completely impossible, due to the complete change of data and factors.

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The Arab countries could have played influential and effective roles in 2013 and 2014, before Russia’s intervention. They could have managed the opposition factions before they were slaughtered by Iran and Russia in many ways and before the US dismantled them by either abandoning them in the deserts to be crushed by Russia’s planes or when the US cut off their supplies and forced them to retreat and collapse, especially in the Syrian desert.

Apart from this, there are many obstacles standing in the way of the participation of Arab forces in Syria, most importantly the logistical factor. How can Arab ground forces be transferred to Syria? How can supply lines be provided to these forces? Arab countries do not have the logistical resources available to America, and America itself has used Iraqi and Turkish territory to transport its soldiers and equipment. Meanwhile, Russia used many means, especially sea routes, to transport arms and equipment, which are not available at all to any Arab country.

The second obstacle is the absence of an Arab agreement in this regard, as in addition to the major conflicts among the Arab countries on issues unrelated to the Syrian crisis, they also differ in their position on the Assad regime. This is quite obvious in Egypt’s relationship with the regime, as it provides the regime with arms and expertise and defends it openly. How can Egypt be relied on in such a matter that clashes with the interests of Al-Assad and his Russian protectors who it has friendly relations with?

While some Egyptian analysts have built high hopes on an Egyptian position in Syria based on a sentence in Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s speech at the most recent Arab League summit in Dhahran where he said: “Foreign parties have forgotten that Syria is Arab land,” but that was just his way of provoking Turkey and turning the Arab public opinion against it.

The biggest obstacle is the presence of Russia, which would never allow things to go this way in Syria, especially since Russia views the eastern region of Syria -that the US wants to withdraw from – as a valuable target because of its important wealth of oil, gas, water and agricultural land. It lost hundreds of mercenaries in an attempt to control the area, as this area constitutes the main place where Iranians cross in to Syria, and Iran had planted large numbers of militias there.

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The question now is: How can the supposed Arab forces enter the area to confront Russia and Iran who will undoubtedly rush to fill the vacuum left by America? Will Washington keep part of its air force to help the Arab forces as it is a well known fact that confronting Russia requires a force as strong as it, and there is no other party who can fill this position but America?

The truth of the matter is that the way that the American president proposed this idea is not a means of successfully managing a conflict and no Arab force can succeed in this task given the very complex reality surrounding it. If Trump was serious in working to develop effective alternatives in the Syrian conflict arena, he would do something such as supply the opposition factions in the south, centre and north, with qualitative weapons. Anything else would be an attempt to exploit the Arab countries. When he proposed his idea, maybe Trump thought he had an opportunity to make more money, so he sought to put the Arab parties on the spot rather than actually present a plan to manage the conflict in Syria?

This article first appeared in Arabic in Arabi21 on 20 April 2018

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.