It is nothing new for Saudi Arabia to face a crisis with its Arab and regional neighbours. It faced a crisis with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime and found itself a party in the Yemen war in the 1960s. It faced another crisis with the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime when he invaded Kuwait; and the country suffered turbulent relations with the Syrian and Sadat regimes, as well as its famous rivalry with Libya’s Gaddafi, to name but a few.
The kingdom has experienced rivalries and disputes with ideological trends that contradicted the conservative Saudi approach. It dealt with the spread of nationalists, Nasserites and Baathists, and interacted with left-wing and revolutionary governments. It also had a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood; it played various cards and learned to play them well. Despite this, Saudi Arabia has been able to maintain balanced policies and avoid slipping into a zero-sum equation. Instead, it manoeuvred expertly, reconciled with some and confronted others, all the while maintaining a balance that helped it to avoid decisive battles. It has remained an important player in the region and established its status without adopting decisive rivalries and absolute biases one way or the other.
The reign of the late King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz witnessed a deviation from the usual Saudi approach to foreign policy. This is seen in the current regional situation, which reveals the magnitude of disorder in Saudi policies over recent years: Sanaa has fallen into the hands of the Houthis and the Yemenis have no one to defend them against the Iran-controlled rebels except Al-Qaeda; and the kingdom ignored the near-genocide and humiliation suffered by the Sunnis in Iraq, until the latter found that only the Islamic State (ISIS) would defend them.
As for Syria, where the revolution disturbed Saudi calculations and fears, the gap has been filled by Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In addition, thanks to Riyadh’s misplaced political focus, Lebanon has become Hezbollah’s state, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is considered to be the most cohesive bloc in the Arab world, is deeply divided; Qatar has been threatened with a blockade, while Oman has threatened to withdraw in favour of a strategic alliance with Iran.
Saudi’s policy on Palestine during the rule of the late king was riddled with errors, personal impressions and mood swings. After the Palestinian reconciliation conference hosted by Saudi in Makkah, King Abdullah was overcome by a personal vendetta against Hamas. Of course, the kingdom’s quiet but complicit positions regarding Israel’s wars on Gaza and the Israeli-Egyptian blockade made it a party in the war against the resistance movements.
However, the most reckless bias in Saudi politics during the reign of King Abdullah was that towards Egypt. He panicked as he watched the revolutionary tide that toppled the Mubarak regime, and his entourage, led by Khalid Al-Tuwaijri, warned him against the “great risk” posed to his position by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, Saudi joined the UAE-Israeli plan to overthrow Morsi and establish a brutal military government in order for Egypt to slip into a downward spiral of violence and disorder.
It was outrageous for the king to rush to support the military coup before its features became clear; it was even more outrageous for him to stand by the coup while it has eliminated thousands of Egyptians and shed their blood before the eyes and ears of the world.
The idea of supporting Al-Sisi’s government was so deeply engrained in King Abdullah’s mind that it became the top priority in his foreign policy; for Al-Sisi’s sake, the kingdom disputed with some and allied with others without taking into consideration its own internal and external interests or its position in the world. For the sake of Al-Sisi, Saudi Arabia fought with Qatar and almost destroyed the GCC.
It was for Al-Sisi too that the government in Riyadh disagreed with Turkey and then added the Muslim Brotherhood to its “terrorist” list. It also incited Western governments against the Islamist activists in their countries; for Al-Sisi, Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars on nothing.
In its adoption of the Egyptian coup, the kingdom suffered heavy losses and lost a number of the important cards that it should have played in order to establish strategic alliances against Iran, the perceived main opponent of Saudi policies. Riyadh really needed an alliance with Turkey, which is strategically and regionally equivalent to Iran. It also needed the moderate Islamist movements in Yemen, Iraq and Syria in order to have similar policies and be able to confront the growing Iranian influence. Saudi could also have used the Palestine card to exclude Iran, which claims to defend Jerusalem; the late king instead broke his own sword and faced his enemy unarmed.
In the midst of its distraction with fighting the futile war against moderate Islamic movements, another fiercer and more hostile alternative emerged: trapped between Al-Qaeda to the south and ISIS in the north, Saudi society needs to be imprisoned and gagged in order for citizens to submit to the irrational official logic.
King Abdullah’s death presents a new opportunity for Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. Perhaps the newly-crowned King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef are the most aware of the extent of the damage inflicted by the late king’s policies regarding Saudi’s status and strategic interests.
The principles of sound political thought require the identification of the priorities stemming from the state’s strategic interests, and then the establishment of alliances based on these priorities. Unfortunately, foreign policies during the reign of the late king were characterised by personal disputes, petulance, short-sighted calculations and chasing after reckless disputes that were exaggerated grossly by the Emirates and implanted in the mind of the king and his entourage. This caused the kingdom to lose its national, regional and international credibility. Saudi citizens saw their government losing its usual balance and adopting impulsive policies which contradicted public opinion on very sensitive issues.
The situation requires the new monarch to reconsider a number of issues and portfolios. If the Iranian tide is the number one strategic threat to Saudi Arabia, then it is natural for the kingdom to forge an alliance with Turkey and to rearrange and reconcile internal Gulf affairs by listening to different views. These have to be taken into consideration instead of using the language of pressure and threats as was done during King Abdullah’s reign.
With regards to Egypt, Saudi Arabia must ensure that all of Egypt is stable; not just Al-Sisi’s Egypt, but the Egyptians’ Egypt, inclusive of all of its groups and factions. It is not wise for Riyadh to play a role in Cairo’s battle with the Muslim Brotherhood, for Egypt will never be stable if the movement is excluded from political life. Perhaps a Saudi-Turkey-Qatar partnership will succeed in preparing an acceptable vision for genuine national reconciliation to achieve political, economic and social stability in Egypt.
Yemen is the home of the Arabian Peninsula’s historic roots. It is unacceptable for Saudi Arabia to continue to neglect what’s happening there. Rescuing Yemen from the clutches of Iran requires openness from Riyadh to the Islamist, national and tribal forces in its southern neighbour without bowing to the deluded fears of one party or the other. Moreover, the protection of Yemen also protects the future of Bahrain, which will be the next target of Iran’s expansion plan.
The Palestinian card is very important for Saudi Arabia’s status in the Arab and Muslim world, and is critical for the government’s position in the hearts of its citizens. Saudi must restore its relations with Hamas and pull the resistance movement away from Iran’s clutches. The kingdom must also work towards ending the blockade of Gaza, which would boost its status and credibility both locally and internationally.
King Salman’s ascension to the throne is an important opportunity for a comprehensive reconciliation with everyone, especially the various parties that have taken the initiative to show good faith towards Riyadh. For example, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan disrupted his African tour to attend Abdullah’s funeral while the Islamic movements rushed to send positive signs that must be acknowledged and responded to.
The Muslim Brotherhood issued a strong obituary for King Abdullah, as did Hamas, Ennahda in Tunisia, Yemen’s Congregation for Reform and other Islamic groups. If the artificial rift between the Saudi government and every other party is fated to be mended, then this will be a new era of balance and stability for the region, with a major impact on all of the conflicts plaguing the Arab world.
This certainly does not mean that the Islamic movements are blameless; they have made serious mistakes and failed on a number of levels. However, harsh experience has taught everyone an important lesson that must be learnt in order for the region to turn over a new page of co-existence. The alternative is the rapid growth and expansion of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, plunging the Middle East into a new equation with different calculations to make; it is unlikely to be able to deal with that.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.