Is there a possible peaceful solution in Syria? It has been said that politics is the art of the possible; but it cannot be so without the fulfillment of the necessary conditions and prerequisites. There is yet another question: Can there be a solution in Syria without a solution in Iraq? That is impossible. Although separating the two cases may have been possible in the immediate aftermath of the American occupation of Iraq and at the start of the Syrian revolution, the conditional association of the two cases have now become too intertwined and complicated for such separation to continue to make sense. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the main regional players in both Iraq and Syria, and they are essentially fighting a proxy war in both countries using their own money, weapons, intelligence and generals. The militias that are fighting inside Iraq are the same ones that are fighting inside Syria. Iran’s objective in both countries is one and the same: to maintain a Shiite-led government; while Saudi Arabia’s aim, equally, is to re-assert Sunni dominance in both countries. This means that both countries’ interests in finding a political solution in Syria are organically linked to a political solution in Iraq, and vice versa.
Many Sunnis now believe that the Arab and American armies are fighting Sunni militias such as ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra in both Iraq and Syria but are keeping quiet when it comes to the Shiite militias that are engaged in the war with Iranian instructions and funding. It seems as if the Arabs are conducting themselves in this theatre of war without a strategy to guide them. Just like Barack Obama, they are confused; they engage in what they call a “war on terrorism” but they are losing in this war on more than one front. Even if they succeed in destroying the Sunni militias, it is the Iranian-backed Shiite militias who see to gain. The irony, of course, is that it was the states of those very armies now fighting ISIS, the US and the Gulf monarchies, who provided the funding and arms for ISIS to succeed in the first place.
The scene is approaching the surreal. Persian Iran with its Shiite ideology is using Arab Shiite militias, while the Sunni Arab countries are finding themselves in a war with Arab Sunni militias that they originally (albeit covertly) supported and who are fighting Iran by virtue of their engagement in a war with the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria. The Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan, agree among themselves that the Sunni militias are the ones that pose direct threat to them. However, they disagree when it comes to the threat posed by Iran and the Shiite militias.
The post-occupation Iraqi government, established on a sectarian basis by the mismanagement of the US occupation, relies on Shiite militias and on an alliance with Iran for its continued existence. The government of the “Socialist Arab Ba’ath” in Syria was compelled in the face of the revolution to unveil its sectarian identity. Its existence too has become dependent on Shiite militias and on Iranian support. This surreal scene is augmented by the fact that neither can Iran impose its own power on the region, nor can the Arab states fill the regional vacuum (as much as they may try) and limit Iran’s role. the increasingly sectarianised rhetoric in which Iran is equated with Shiite religious ideology and the Arab countries with fundamentalism Sunni zeal, only exacerbated the situation.
There is thus a destructive strategic freeze. What augments it further is that the perplexed Obama administration seems more in need of a nuclear accord with Iran than a consideration of its role within the region. For the sake of reaching an agreement, the US seems willing to lower its gaze when it comes to Iran’s political conduct in Iraq and Syria. The US administration considers ISIS to be its number one enemy, and the source of danger to it. The administration is making a cynical, but rather stupid, distinction between the situation in Iraq and the situation in Syria. It is seeking a solution in the first by waging war on ISIS while ignoring the fact that such a solution is simply impossible to reach without finding a solution for the problem in the second. What is even worse is that it desires this solution in Iraq without pressing for a solution in Syria. In other words, the Obama administration is disregarding the first and most important prerequisite of a political solution; namely the factor of balancing powers on the ground.
At last we are beginning to see this observation in the American media. Here is David Petraeus, currently the most prominent American general who was commander of the US troops in Iraq between 2007 and 2008, saying in a lengthy interview with The Washington Post on Friday that “the primary danger threatening the stability of Iraq on the long term and threatening the regional balance of power is now represented by the Shiite militias many of which are supported by Iran, which also instructs some of them.”
American writer Thomas Freedman asks: “Why are we for the third time since 2011 fighting on behalf of Iran? In 2002, we destroyed the Taliban, Iran’s enemy number one in Afghanistan. In 2003, we destroyed Saddam Hussein, Iran’s enemy number one in Iraq. And now, what is our interest in fighting the last line of defence [meaning ISIS] in the face of Iran’s hegemony over Iraq?” In fact, this question should also be posed to the Arab states that are taking part in the war against ISIS.
The real question, then, is: Why should Iran look for a political solution, whether in Iraq or in Syria, so long as the situation is like this? The Iraqi government is under its control and Bashar Al-Asad has become a bargaining chip in its hand. So what is it that may entice Tehran to accept a premature political solution? So far, nothing. In fact, the opposite is the case. It would seem that everything entices Tehran to avoid such a solution in the present circumstances. The nuclear agreement is still being negotiated, the Arabs are still outside regional reckoning and Arab civil wars are on the increase. In addition to all of this, there is a confused inward-looking American stance that goes hand in hand with unprecedented Arab division and Arab paralysis. The absence or impossibility of a political solution in Syria is the source of Iran’s gains.
Yet, Iran is an predicament. Its gains will remain temporary and it is incapable of turning them into permanent ones. It is playing its game within a regional vacuum caused by Arab incapacity. It has succeeded, by capitalising on sectarian zeal stirred up by ISIS and other Sunni militias, in creeping into this vacuum. But there is nothing more to tit than his. The Sunni militias have also crept into the scene via the same vacuum. The outcome is such that Iran is politically in confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. Egypt is using its own special circumstances and its keenness on the unity of Syria as a pretext to stay away from the conflict and augment the power vacuum persisting in the region.
When talking about a political solution within this framework, we should remember that peace, just as war, is governed by the principle of the balance of power. Opting for a political solution out of a moral stance is a sign of political naivety. The example of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a testament to this principle. Why does this conflict seem unresolvable? Because the conditions and prerequisites of the solution are not available. America, the sponsor of the Israeli side and the broker of the so called “peace process” is not serious about peace. Israel does not want a premature solution and only wants it according to its own conditions. The Palestinians are incapable of imposing a solution; and the incapacity of the Palestinians is nothing but an honest reflection of a wider Arab incapacity. The Arabs avoid the option of war and dread the consequences and repercussions of a peace they do not possess.
This experience tells that prior to a political solution there has to be an end to the strategic freeze. If this has not been possible with Israel, which enjoys a strong and coherent Western cover, how can one explain the case of a theocratic state that does not enjoy such external support? The question points to the fact that the main ailment behind this freeze, prior to the American one, is an Arab ailment. How else can the freeze with Iran be broken while the war on terrorism in Iraq and Syria is waged solely along sectarian lines; while in Syria the Arabs have succumbed to Washington’s insistence on keeping the Syrian opposition exposed to the aircraft and rockets of the regime? Considering these facts, talking about a peaceful solution in Syria reminds us of the Arab admonitions to the Palestinians about a similar sort of solution in the 1970s and 80s – what has become of such admonitions thirty years on? The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has recently publicly repudiated this solution and declared his rejection of the American notion of “the two state solution”.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.