With the focus turning to Anbar now is not the time to forget about Tikrit

With the capture of Tikrit completed last month, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have turned to Anbar, hoping to capitalise on their recent victory to lever the Sunni dominated province away from ISIS. The hope is that focusing on Anbar will allow Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi’s government to quieten Sunni suspicions that their communities will be overrun by Iranian aligned Shi’a militias, win new allies and cut off reinforcements for any future assault on the neighbouring strategic city of Mosul. With this in mind, Baghdad has moved to limit the involvement of Shi’a dominated Popular Mobilisation Units and to rely instead on a mixture of ISF and government armed and backed Sunni tribes.

For this strategy to work, Baghdad needs to prove to Iraq’s Sunnis that it will not only support them in the fight against Islamic State, but is equally committed to reconstructing their homes and reintegrating them into the nation. This is not the first time that Iraqi and coalition authorities have leveraged Sunni tribal support to help fight their enemies by offering assurances of a place in the government and military and a share of power, only to later renege on their promises once greater domestic security was achieved. Many Sunnis likely fear a repeat of Nouri al-Maliki’s disastrous decisions to marginalise Sunni politicians and disregard similar declarations to the ‘Anbar Awakening’ tribes, who fought Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This legacy of betrayal and distrust undermines the foundation of Baghdad’s strategy in Anbar. Of course there are already tribes that have pledged support to the government, just as there are those who remain steadfast in their support of ISIS. However, success in this strategy rests upon the government’s ability to convince the undecided majority that helping ISF recapture the province will secure the population’s interests in the long run. Even if a new strategy combining coalition airstrikes and Shi’a militia assistance could defeat ISIS without wide-ranging Sunni support, one must consider the situation that would follow. Baghdad would simply trade ISIS control for long-term instability and disenfranchisement in the Sunni dominated Northwest. Consequently, Iraq’s government must prove that its rule will be more beneficial for Sunni’s than ISIS’s and that its commitment will not flag the moment attention turns to the next battlefield. Therefore, as Saddam’s hometown, and a major Sunni city, Tikrit represents the best place for Abadi to showcase the benefits of reintegration and prove his dedication to building a new, more inclusive Iraq.

Recapturing the city and surrounding countryside required a gruelling month-long campaign involving heavy bombardment of the once bustling metropolis, and extensive US-led coalition airstrikes. Reports from Tikrit suggest that “at least 536 buildings in the city have been affected by the fighting [with] at least 137 completely destroyed and 241 severely damaged”, the worst destruction being in the Southern suburbs where fighting was fiercest.

If Baghdad hopes to demonstrate that it is a better bet for Sunnis than ISIS then repairing this damage should be a priority, despite current fiscal constraints. With falling oil prices and a budget deficit totalling $25 billion, the government is likely to face hard financial choices ahead. Nevertheless, if the US and the international community at large are seriously committed to rolling back ISIS then the allocation of financial assistance for public spending and civilian-led reconstruction will need to be increased. A good start would be to accelerate plans for the establishment of the joint Baghdad-UNAMI Recovery and Reconstruction fund and put it to work in Tikrit. Countering the erosion of infrastructure that occurred during Islamic State’s 10-month occupation and clearing the remaining IEDs left by its retreating fighters would rebuild trust and repair the legitimacy of the Iraqi state in the eyes of the city’s inhabitants and wider Sunni community.

One of the more demanding tasks will be restoring a sense of normality to the population in Tikrit and reinstating law and order. In the wake of the city’s capture, the official line, as declared by Abadi in a news conference in the Kurdish capital of Irbil, was that “only 67 houses and […] around 85 stores were burned, and it’s a very small number for a city with a population of 100,000 people.” This was accompanied by an indeterminate amount of looting, particularly of abandoned homes and businesses. However, reports such as that by the Iraqi MP Mutashar al-Samarri have estimated the number to be much higher.

Blame for the looting and property damage was initially directed at the Shi’a militias who fought in the battle; more recent reports suggest that responsibility lies with the returning Salahuddin police forces. Each of Iraq’s provinces has its own local police force made up of residents from that area. In the Salahuddin case this consists in large measure of tribesmen, particularly from the al-Joubor tribe who, having previously been marginalised under the Saddam regime, sided with the government against ISIS, provoking reprisals. With most of the houses and stores that were looted and burned belonging to ex-Ba’athists and members of Saddam’s, al-Baghdadi’s and other affiliated tribes, the current situation seems to have allowed them to settle old scores. As the political analyst Lataif Ghareeb reported to Al Jazeera, because of their unfamiliarity with the area most Shi’a militias would have been unable to specifically identify and target those buildings. However, when Popular Mobilisation Units were still deployed throughout the city at least some degree of collusion between the two groups must have occurred. Either way, as both are government aligned, blame will inevitably be laid at the feet of Baghdad.

Recently, looting appears to have subsided. The withdrawal of the Popular Mobilisation Units coupled with Abadi’s statement that the government is committed to “preserving the belongings and facilities in Salahuddin province” and prosecuting any individuals found breaking the law, appears to have had a favourable effect on the situation. Nevertheless, in the event that tribal grudges are at the root of the problems in Tikrit and Salahuddin, the government is going to need to pressure the Al Joubor dominated provincial council and police forces to make sure reprisals are avoided. If normal life is to reassert itself in Tikrit, and the 40,000 displaced inhabitants to return, the city’s populace and businesses will need to be able to operate unmolested. To that end, tribal reconciliation will need to be a key policy goal for Baghdad if it is to prevent further conflict.

With Baghdad attempting to spark a new ‘Awakening’ in Anbar the government will need to show the country’s Sunnis that it is wholly committed to supporting them both in the fight against ISIS and the political environment that follows. Emphasising reconstruction, tribal reconciliation and a resurgent civil society in Tikrit could provide the perfect model for what Sunni’s can expect if they support Baghdad. It would further operate as a springboard for winning new allies in their campaigns in Anbar and eventually Mosul. Of course, this will not come cheap but if defeating ISIS and ensuring lasting stability in Iraq is truly at the top of the international communities agenda, then the necessary funding must be provided.

Ultimately, it is not enough to capture territory; Baghdad must demonstrate that it, not ISIS, is the better option.

Tim Hulse is an independent political analyst and commentator.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.