Weeping over the unity of Iraq

A few days ago, the US House Committee on Armed Services passed a bill proposed by Congressman Mac Thornberry that granted $715 million in conditioned military aid to the Iraqi government in order to allow the US to directly arm the Kurds and Arab Sunnis without passing through the government in Baghdad. The draft bill is still in its early stages and has not been completed, but it still provoked immediate responses that are, as usual, contrasting.

The Shia bloc of the Iraqi parliament, known as the National Alliance, all rejected the decision in a resolution issued last Saturday. Due to the heated nature of the discussion, the Arab Sunni and Kurdish representatives left the session and did not participate in the vote. This is an unprecedented event and will not be the last of its kind.

Some Shia officials took their rejection further and threatened to mobilise their militias and threaten American interests. As for Haidar Al-Abadi’s government and his foreign ministry, they took an aligned position that echoed the position of the Shia militias, which was to be expected. However, no one took a distinguished position amongst the Shia elite, except for cleric Mahmoud Al-Hosni, who issued a fatwa necessitating the need to arm the Arab Sunnis directly by saying “Yes, yes, yes to armament”.

Of course, the Kurds welcomed the bill after suffering greatly from the promises of the central government, which is militarily supported by the Peshmerga forces. However, most of the promises were not kept.

The Sunni Arabs generally welcome the bill, but some have reservations while others dispute minor details. Those who supported the bill, such as the Arab Sunnis in Al-Abadi’s government, as well as local councils and tribes targeted by Islamic State (ISIS), are frustrated after they realised that Haidar Al-Abadi’s government is not serious about arming them, nor does it seek to strengthen them in their fight against the extremist Islamic State organisation. In the eyes of these tribesmen, the current government’s approach is no different than that of deposed premier Nouri Al-Maliki, who went as far as to strip them of personal arms. By depriving the Sunnis of their elements of strength, Al-Abadi is directly allowing the involvement of an alternative, i.e. factional militias in the operations implemented in Sunni areas, especially in Al-Anbar, as they are equipped with heavy, medium and light arms. This is rejected by the Sunnis out of fear of being subjected to the looting, digging up of graves, kidnapping of innocents, killing based on identity, burnings of mosques, and destruction of businesses and interests suffered in Tikrit.

As for conservative Arab Sunnis, their justification for their reservations is their dispute with the American administration regarding its double standards and the security challenge that is not only limited to the extremist Islamic State organisation, as the American administration believes, but also includes 45 other sectarian militias.

The Sunnis also express reservations due to their dispute with the US over the ideal method to confront the Islamist organisation after it has been historically proven that the exclusive use of weaponry against them is a futile option that is extremely costly. The best alternative is using a variety of means that, in addition to the use of force against ISIS, includes alleviating the marginalisation of the Sunni population that was structurally imposed by the US-backed Shia-led government established 11 years ago.

While the positions and arguments have varied, the Shia elites call for preserving the unity of Iraq, but many Sunnis believe (rightly or wrongly) that their implicit and true propose for rejecting the bill is to weaken the Sunnis. Sunnis believe that the Shia do not want a strong Sunni partner; they want them to remain weak and helpless. Such arguments only entrench the sectarian divide that is ravaging the country and make the possibility of reconciliation increasingly remote.

As I have noted, the Shia elites are trying to justify their rejection of the bill by harping on about the unity of Iraq and national sovereignty. However, I do not know what unified Iraq they are talking about; the old Iraq was made up of a patchwork community of various nationalities, doctrines, and religions. This is all in the past.

The problem with the American administration is that it is pragmatic. It gives complete attention to those in authority, even if they are wrong, and are completely responsibility for the lack of faith. On another note, unlike the organisation of the Shia internal affairs, often sponsored by Iran, the Arab Sunni internal affairs are chaotic and have no sponsor, as there are various visions and positions. In this case, it is relatively easy for the American administration to deal with them, as it was easy for Bremmer in 2003 to deal with the Shias. Therefore, the American administration issued the first statements, immediately acknowledging the reaction of the Shia elites and including the position of Haidar Al-Abadi’s government. This may later drive the Americans to reconsider the text of the bill because any American administration will still need Haidar Al-Abadi’s government in order to confront ISIS, while the administration will have trouble pinpointing the majority Sunni position in order to address it. In fact, there is no majority Sunni position. The Sunnis in Iraq continue to suffer from the shadow of Baathism and the legacy of Saddam Hussein.

Despite the fact that the bill is limited to armament, everyone is faced with a new test. Haidar Al-Abadi’s government must fulfil its obligations to the Sunni Arabs, which are of a political and human rights nature, as a condition for the continuation of weapons aid, while the Arab Sunnis must unite their ranks and agree on the best course of action in a way that does not undermine the sovereignty of the government.

However, since the Shia bloc was the only to reject the bill, the Kurds and Arab Sunnis are given a future chance to coordinate their positions in common issues and therefore they will be more able to influence and draw polices, especially regarding Al-Abadi’s government, the Iranian influence, or the confrontation of terrorism and extremism.

Now, American Congress has been reassured of Al-Abadi’s government’s position against the Arab Sunnis and is therefore expected to continue its efforts to pas the bill. As for the Sunni Arabs, the only thing they can do in face of this is to assume a united position. This can only be achieved by first arranging their internal affairs, which is no longer an optional matter or a luxury, it is now obligatory and a duty not only to protect their interest, but for the sake of Iraq.

Translated from Al-Sharq on 6 May 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.