Tunisia’s 2024 presidential election turnout: A critical appraisal and the way forward

Yesterday, Tunisia held its third presidential election amid an atmosphere fraught with scepticism and controversy on an unprecedented scale. The political pluralism that characterised the electoral processes of the previous decade, although seen as a sham by many, seems to have eroded – a significantly alarming trend in today’s Tunisia. Instead, the deliberate use of pre-2011 authoritarian tactics, such as legislative manipulation and the systematic exclusion of critical voices, has become the prevailing norm. This included preventing civil society organisations, activists, youth and opposition political parties from meaningful participation in the electoral process. In addition to this Orwellian political context, Tunisians have already been facing the repercussions of a poorly performing economy and inflation – a situation that has undermined their resilience and deepened their sense of disillusionment with politics. Although this low voter turnout – 27.7 per cent – is no surprise, it warrants critical analysis.

A controversial political context

To guard against simplistic or reductive analysis, it is essential to stress from the onset that post-2011 Tunisia’s polity has always been dominated by polarisation and power struggles. Since 2011, and despite the initial prospects of a promising democratic transition, competition between the Islamists and the secularists has been harsh, reaching its apex in 2013, especially after the assassination of opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. Following the 2014 presidential election, settlements between late President El Beji Caid Essebsi and Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi became the norm in Tunisia’s politics, often at the expense of democratic consolidation.

Despite the importance of this consensus-based politics that the two leaders utilised to safeguard their parties’ interests, balance their relationships and mitigate the potential risk of another political feud, they both failed to address the socio-economic quagmire. In short, while inter-elite settlements may have saved the country from violent civil unrest and state collapse, they have not tackled Tunisians’ fundamental demands, primarily employment, liberty and national dignity (شغل، حرية، كرامة وطنية).

After the 2019 parliamentary election, Tunisians’ bitterness and frustration with some elected representatives’ lack of discipline and professionalism further increased. For instance, clashes between rival political blocs during parliamentary sessions frequently erupted, leading to verbal and physical altercations and heightened tensions between the Ennahda Party, the Dignity Coalition (Al-Karama) and their opponents, such as the Free Destourian Party. Between 2020 and 2021, despite the high stakes of getting contaminated by COVID-19, Tunisians protested against Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi’s government’s inability to provide adequate public services. This volatile situation accentuated the gap between Tunisians and the political class and paved the way for drastic changes in the political landscape.

Read: A second presidential term for Kais Saied … at what political cost?

Kais Saied’s Tunisia

On 25 July, 2021, President Kais Saied executed a power grab by suspending the 2014 parliament and dismissing the prime minister. This move was widely criticised and deemed as a deadly blow to Tunisia’s democratic transition. Saied subsequently consolidated power by drafting a new constitution and enacting presidential decrees, such as Decree 54, that restricted freedom of expression and stifled dissent. His administration(s) have engaged in a systematic crackdown on opposition figures, journalists, like Sonia Dahmani, Borhen Bssais, and Mourad Zghidi, and civil society activists through arrests and legal actions. These events have raised serious concerns about the future of democracy in Tunisia.

In the run-up to yesterday’s presidential election, several candidates were sentenced to prison or disqualified. On Saturday, a Tunisian court sentenced five potential candidates – Abdellatif Mekki, Nizar Chaari, Mourad Messaoudi, Mohamed Adel Dou and Leila Hammami – to eight months in prison for alleged vote-buying, effectively barring them from running. Additionally, Abir Moussi, a prominent opposition leader and head of the Free Destourian Party, received a two-year sentence for insulting the election commission – the Independent Higher Authority for Elections (ISIE) – disqualifying her from candidacy.

On 30 August, despite a ruling by the Administrative Court that called for candidates like Imad Daimi, Mondher Zenaidi and Ayachi Zammel to be reinstated, the ISIE rejected their candidacy. On 27 September, Tunisia’s parliament passed a “new law that stripped the Administrative Court of its authority in electoral matters, preventing it from acting as a check on abuses”.

Voters cast their ballots to vote for Tunisia’s crucial presidential election in Tunis, Tunisia on October 06, 2024. [Mohamed Mdalla – Anadolu Agency]

The underlying factors of the low voter turnout

Two interlinked factors explain the low voter turnout in this presidential election. Firstly, there is a lack of trust and disillusionment among Tunisians regarding the electoral process and politics in general. As highlighted above, the inability of post-2011 governments to fulfil the fundamental demands advocated throughout the Tunisian Revolution – employment, liberty and national dignity – seems to have affected Tunisian’s trust in the prospects of change and reform. In other words, Tunisians, particularly the younger generations, have often felt a profound sense of marginalisation and considered their votes unimportant. This negative perception has caused apathy and disengagement from the electoral process. Thus, the decline of trust in political institutions has significantly influenced voter turnout.

Secondly, the increasing polarisation of Tunisia’s politics to unprecedented levels accounts for voters’ absenteeism, especially the youth, whose turnout reached only (6 per cent).

Divisive political discourse, accusations of treachery, the suppression of freedom of expression through the notorious Decree 54, the imprisonment of potential presidential candidates and activists and restricting civil society organisations’ access to monitor the election process, have negatively impacted citizens’ trust in a political system that is fuelling polarisation and gradually returning the country to one-man rule.

The way forward

Contentious politics and socioeconomic strain have historically driven civil unrest in Tunisia and elsewhere in the world. If the government continues on this trajectory, there is a looming risk of witnessing an escalation of mass protests that could further destabilise the country. Regardless of the outcome of this election, the need for a national dialogue is more apparent than ever. Engaging Tunisia’s political actors, civil society groups, journalists, syndicates, business owners, scholars, youth and women in a “meaningful” and “authentic” dialogue is essential to addressing long standing socio-economic and political issues. This national dialogue should seriously discuss social and economic reform, civil liberties, political accountability, good governance and fighting corruption to rebuild trust and improve state-society relationship. A national dialogue with broad-based representation could inspire innovative reforms to save the country from the repercussions of political exclusion and protracted socioeconomic deprivation.

Read: Another coup in Tunisia

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.