Turkiye and Trump: theoretical optimism, but practical concern

Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election and his move back to the White House in January, let alone concerns about his nominees for positions within his administration, have led to analysts and governments trying to anticipate his policies and the repercussions around the world in terms of America’s influence over various international and regional issues. Trump’s personality and his expected approach to governance also comes into play.

Turkiye, traditionally prefers Republican administrations in Washington, because they tend to interfere less in Ankara’s internal affairs than the Democrats do, especially with regard to freedoms, democracy and the Kurdish issue. This has become the case even more after Biden’s presidency in particular, as his election campaign included statements about the need to support the Turkish opposition to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Relations between Ankara and Washington have not been at their best during the Biden presidency, as he removed Turkiye from the F-35 fighter programme and his administration delayed the delivery of F-16 fighters (the alternative project) despite promises and despite Ankara’s approval of Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.

Hence, Ankara seems to be more optimistic about Trump’s victory, and Erdogan called to congratulate him on his victory. The Turkish president expressed his confidence in better relations between their two countries, and positive progress in defence matters, calling on him to keep his election promise to stop the regional and other wars.

This optimism seems to be based on diplomatic protocol and expresses Turkish hopes and aspirations rather than a position based on a positive assessment.

However, Erdogan and Trump had a good personal relationship during Trump’s first term, so we can reasonably expect the same again, although this was not always reflected in relations between the two sides, which was generally unstable and witnessed some crises.

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As well as the decline in institutional communication between Washington and Ankara, Trump threatened to “destroy the Turkish economy” in a tweet following the Pastor Andrew Brunson crisis, which had a direct and profound negative impact. Trump sent Erdogan a message using far from diplomatic language, which some saw as an insult and the Turkish presidency refused to accept it. The US president, as he was at the time, also imposed economic sanctions and other sanctions related to the defence industry, which ended in Biden’s term with Turkiye’s removal from the F-35 programme, because Ankara bought the Russian S-400 missile defence system. Ironically, Trump had said he understood Turkiye’s need to purchase this system due to the Obama administration’s lack of cooperation on the issue.

The US president-elect is returning to the White House stronger than in his first term, given his sweeping victory, the Republican majority in Congress, and the fact that it is his second and so final term. He can build on the experience of the first term, and should be free from political pressures and electoral considerations.

Moreover, Ankara traditionally views Washington as an influential superpower. Now, with Trump at the helm again, Turkiye believes that his administration will use that influence and be decisive in several of Turkiye’s high priority issues, most notably the economy, armaments and the Kurdish issue, in addition to Syria and the US-backed militias there and wars across the region.

Past experience of Trump’s unpredictable and often surprising personality is a source of concern for Ankara, not least because of the influence of the occupation state of Israel and its lobby on US foreign policy. As things stand at the moment, Trump will be sworn in as president amid Israel’s genocide in Gaza and attack on Lebanon.

The Trump administration looks as if it is going to be filled with pro-Israel bias based on ideological rather than US interests.

Hence, Ankara fears that Washington will view relations with Turkiye from this angle, not least because it has been one of the most vocal critics of Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right government. Turkiye has also imposed economic sanctions on Israel and joined the genocide lawsuit filed by South Africa before the International Court of Justice. It is also expected and is perhaps likely that the next US administration will formulate its policies towards Iran, the Kurdish issue, and the Israeli genocide based on the interests of the occupation state, which is an additional source of concern for Ankara. However, the latter may view some of these policies as an opportunity for Turkiye, given that the Erdogan government believes that putting pressure on Tehran is in Turkiye’s interest, albeit without too much escalation or open warfare.

Erdogan is counting on his ability to convince Trump of some decisions and approaches that are beneficial to Turkiye, such as stopping the Israeli genocide, preventing the expansion of war in the region, and stopping the Russian-Ukrainian war, as Turkiye can play a role in some respects. Ankara remains apprehensive, though, given Trump’s general unpredictability.

Turkiye’s optimism about Trump’s return to the White House is not based on exact data; it is based on what it hopes for.

As such, Ankara will wait and see what the new administration’s policies are while communicating with figures close to the president and the leading figures in his administration.

The immediate expectation is that Ankara will try to avoid any major crisis with Trump, while seeking to play roles in issues where the two countries’ approaches may converge, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Syria and even the genocide in Gaza and the war against Lebanon. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that much will depend on Donald Trump’s own view of relations with Turkiye and the issues which are important to Ankara.

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Translated from Arabi21,  18 November 2024

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.