The Sudan war poses some difficult questions

Various initiatives failed to stop the war between the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement until negotiations between the two parties were organised based on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Declaration of Principles issued on 20 May, 1994, which was approved by both parties. While it is true that the Declaration of Principles was drafted by the IGAD countries and presented to the two parties to sign, it must be noted that its provisions were not inspired by the ideas of international and regional political scientists as much as they were a reformulation and rearrangement of the various proposals and theses in the literature of the Sudanese political movement, especially the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.

Today, I firmly believe that the Sudanese civil and political forces are the only ones qualified to produce the Declaration of Principles that could act as a prelude to a negotiation process, as well as to produce the vision that constitutes the content and details of this process to move towards stopping the war and laying the foundations for avoiding a reproduction of the crisis in the country. In this context, there are two points related to the Declaration of Principles, the first of which is the need for all parties to agree to it, including the warring parties, so that it can be a basic starting point for the negotiation process.

Hence, and this is the second point, its provisions could address general guidelines that are easy to agree upon. These could include adherence to the principles of the December 2018 revolution; the unity of Sudan; democratic civilian rule; a federal system that takes into account pluralism and diversity; a single army and its formation of all regular forces on a professional and national basis; reform of the civil service and the judicial system; Sudanese to Sudanese dialogue; and other principles that everyone will accept, although it is possible that some will do so out of fear.

It is clear that the Declaration of Principles alone is not sufficient to stop the fighting.

However, it acts as a measure for the extent of possible concessions in the negotiation process, as the concessions for the success of the negotiation process in favour of the main goal — stopping the war, and introducing a democratic civilian transition — must not reach the point of a clash between the content of the Declaration of Principles and the content of what will be agreed upon at the negotiating table.

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In contrast, the vision that constitutes the content and details of the negotiation process to move towards stopping the war consists of possible answers to questions related to how to stop the war and the repercussions. We must consider the fact that these questions are not merely theoretical imaginings as much as they stem from the country’s current troubled reality.

Obviously, while the questions regarding the vision remain the same and are constant, the answers to them differ from one party to another. However, it is also obvious that the anti-war civil and political forces will agree on unified answers to these questions and produce their vision that must be presented in any negotiating forum that seeks to stop the war. It is perhaps necessary to point out that facilitating the civil and political forces to reach the desired vision requires agreement in advance on a set of facts, including that the current war has created a new reality that must change the way civil forces think when it comes to dealing with the details of current events and their repercussions, and that this new reality must examine and contemplate the root causes of the war.

The latter start with the fact that since independence, Sudan has failed to express all of its national components, which led to the emergence of the evil cycle and the general crisis in the country with its many manifestations, including military coups, conflicts and the outbreak of wars that, until recently, were on the outskirts before taking a new and shocking turn with their outbreak in the country’s capital on 15 April 2023. One of the direct results of this is the weakening of the Sudanese state and its inability to utilise all of its political, social and cultural components to agree on a national renaissance project that will rescue the country from the abyss, which it has been on the verge of since the dawn of independence 68 years ago.

The Sudanese are still committed to this project, even in the midst of this criminal war, which cannot be decided militarily.

No party will win it, even if the other party is defeated, and the only losers will be the Sudanese people and the country. Every new day in the war brings with it more wounds and pain for our people and more destruction to the country’s structure and infrastructure. The essence of this war carries blatant hostility to the December Revolution.

I base my point of view on the nature of the vision to end the war and on rejecting the war acting as an alternative to dialogue and negotiation to resolve political and social differences and crises, no matter how severe and complex they are. I also base it on the fact that the issue of stopping the war must be dealt with as one package consisting of three sub-packages that complement each other, including stopping the fighting, providing urgent humanitarian aid and protecting civilians, and launching a new political process.

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While the international and regional community plays a major role in the first and second packages, the third package, the political process, is exclusively the task of the Sudanese civil and political forces. The role of the international and regional community in the first and second packages will not bear fruit unless it is through the vision that will be devised by the civil and political forces that reject the war.

The essence of this vision, from my point of view, is the sum of the answers to what we call the difficult questions related to the Sudan war, which I present briefly below. I hope to expand upon them in future articles.

What, we must ask, are the available options regarding the future and role of the armed forces’ leadership in Sudan after the end of the conflict? What are the options regarding the future of the Rapid Support Forces and the future of other armed movements and militias based on the idea of building a single professional army in the country?

Moreover, we need to ask how we can develop a framework for justice and transitional justice that ensures justice for victims and the prevention of impunity, as well as how we might deal with the international and regional aspects of the war. Finally, we need to establish what the details of the political process are in terms of its agenda and parties. 

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.