If asked to identify major milestones that have shaped the Middle East over the past hundred years, they would most likely be the First World War (1914-1918); the 1948 Nakba in Palestine; the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990; and the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively.
The First World War ended the age of empires, as a result of which the modern Middle East emerged, based on nation states. The Nakba saw the creation of an existential threat to the Arab world — the Zionist state of Israel — and set in motion a series of military coups and Arab social revolutions seeking liberation from foreign occupation and domination. Its repercussions also included the demise of the budding Arab liberal experiment and the foundation for all Israeli wars up to the latest, the genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza (2023-2025).
The momentous events of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran saw the republic setting out to export the revolution. Iran’s attempts to expand regionally were aborted by the war with Iraq (1980-1988), but the results of that war also paved the way for the invasion of Kuwait (1990), as it undermined all perceptions of Arab national security, opened the door to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause through failed peace processes, and gave Al-Qaeda a pretext to launch its attacks in September 2001. This was responded to by the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, as a result of which an arc of Iranian influence emerged extending from western Afghanistan to the eastern Mediterranean.
For nearly two decades (2003-2023), Iran effectively controlled the Middle East and inherited the Arab role in the Palestinian cause.
This continued until Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in October 2023, which helped to create the conditions conducive to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, a kind of collateral damage. The ouster of Assad is the most prominent milestone in the history of the Middle East since the US invasion of Iraq, and it heralds major transformations, including the end of the longest bilateral alliance that the Middle East has known in the past half century.
When Assad fell, Iran lost four decades of work on its project to overlook the Mediterranean at a cost of around $60 billion in the past decade alone. With the collapse of Iran’s “advanced defence” doctrine, Tehran was faced with two possibilities: the nuclear option, or accept its loss and withdraw.
In contrast to Iran’s decline, the roles of Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have developed. Theoretically, with the collapse of the Iranian regional project, Saudi Arabia is no longer in so much need of US security guarantees, or in a hurry to normalise relations with Israel as a way to obtain them. The kingdom appears to be in a comfortable geopolitical position, especially if the new regime in Damascus becomes Riyadh’s ally.
With the fall of the Assad regime and the decline of Iranian influence, Turkiye is likely to become the main regional power.
This will strengthen its negotiating positions in relations with Russia, the West, Israel and the Arabs. If it can demarcate its maritime borders with Syria, it will reshape all of the regional alliances and the balance of power.
The Cyprus-Egypt-Greece alliance will certainly be affected in this case, and the future of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) will be in question. It is also likely that the fall of Assad will contribute to redrawing the energy transportation and economic crossings map in the region after the road is closed to the Friendship Pipeline project to transport Iranian gas through Iraq to Syria, and the Development Road project between Turkiye and the Gulf will be opened. However, that is already facing complications due to the lack of enthusiasm in Iran and among Tehran’s Iraqi allies, so that may also be reconsidered, as will the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.
Post-Assad, Hezbollah’s regional role has been ended and weakened in Lebanon because the movement has lost its main supply route through Syria. This was also evident in the election of a new president and the formation of Nawaf Salam’s government in Lebanon.
The fall of the Syrian regime will also have major repercussions on the Russian position in the Eastern Mediterranean, whether in confronting Turkiye or NATO, or its position as an influential force in the international system, including in Africa.
The Syrian story is not over yet, as its chapters are still being written. Nevertheless, it is likely to have repercussions that go far beyond what most interpretations already seem to have concluded.
This article first appeared in Arabic in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on 19 February 2025
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