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Why didn’t Israel win in Gaza?

February 27, 2025 at 11:00 pm

People gather to stage a protest, demanding the continuation of the hostage swap agreement between Hamas and Israel, at Hostages’ Square in Tel Aviv, Israel on February 22, 2025 [Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu Agency]

Several Israeli analyses agree that Israel did not win its war on the Gaza Strip. What it did achieve, though, was the extermination of the people and the complete destruction of most of the enclave. Some of them suggest that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ministers issue strongly-worded statements, but that they are nothing more than “sweet talk without cover and promises without being backed up.”

Although what lies behind this consensus is emphasis on the need to continue the war and focus on specific goals, it also explores the depths of the failures from which the occupation state is still not secure. To avoid generalisation, it should be said that mouthpieces in the current Israeli government and Netanyahu himself also adopt this approach, some of whom do so with the aim of holding the leadership of the military establishment responsible for the consequences in this matter. Meanwhile, others assert that the leadership of the political establishment bears no less responsibility for these consequences than the armed forces.

To exemplify what I mean, a report published by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, titled “The Long-Awaited Victory Over Hamas Was Not Achieved — What Now?” on 20 February said that, “The IDF [Israel Defence Forces] strategy defines victory as ‘achieving the war objectives set by the political leadership and the ability to impose Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and post-war security-political arrangements on the enemy.’ Israel has not achieved these objectives in the war in Gaza.”

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There is a constant reminder that the war’s goals were defined as the following: destroying the military and government capabilities of Hamas; freeing the kidnapped Israelis; ensuring the safe return of the residents of the Gaza envelope [Israeli settlements adjacent to the enclave] to their homes; and establishing a reality in which Hamas does not control the Gaza Strip, and the Strip does not pose a threat to Israel.

According to more than one military analyst or former military commander, Israel failed to achieve three and a half of the four goals of the war, only succeeding in half-achieving the goal related to the release of the kidnapped soldiers. Some of them stress that, “The current framework for the release of the hostages does not reflect Israel imposing its terms for a ceasefire but rather a compromise dictated by Hamas’s demands, as the organisation seeks to ensure its survival at any cost,” according to the INSS report. “The goal of eliminating Hamas’s control over Gaza and removing its threat to Israel remains far from being realised under the current conditions.” On the contrary, Israeli analyses believe that the most important goal achieved by Hamas is its continued control of Gaza.

Regarding the INSS report, it is important to note its acknowledgement that the exchange deal “is a clear admission that Israel has not achieved total victory; it provides a battered Hamas with the essential lifeline to maintain its rule and rebuild; it results in the release of over a thousand terrorists [sic], many of whom are likely to return to terrorism [sic] and kill Israelis; and it allows Hamas to retain several hostages as leverage for its continued survival.”

This brief overview would not be complete without pointing out that a small minority of Israeli analysts believe that the time has come for political action in the field of national security, as the majority still believe that there is a need to resume the war. According to them, next week the new IDF Chief of the General Staff, Eyal Zamir, will assume his duties, and they hope that he will work to restore the army to its former glory, and transform it into a fighting army, with a fighting spirit, capable of waging war and winning.

Moreover, the prevalent opinion is that at this stage, Israel should focus on two main efforts: completing the path that ensures the return of the remaining kidnapped Israelis, and “leverage President Trump’s declaration” to displace Gaza’s residents in order to enhance effective participation of the Arab countries in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and stabilising it by ending Hamas’s rule of the Strip.

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This article first appeared in Arabic in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on 26 February 2025

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.