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The mediation wars: how Turkiye and Saudi Arabia compete for the Ukraine file

March 14, 2025 at 11:03 am

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (L) meets with Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (R) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11, 2025. [Ukrainian Presidency / Handout – Anadolu Agency]

When, on 11 March, talks hosted by Saudi Arabia resulted in the United States and Ukraine agreeing on a 30-day ceasefire in the ongoing war against Russian forces, it signalled possibly the most significant diplomatic breakthrough since the start of Moscow’s invasion three years ago.

That agreement, which included a number of other terms such as the resumption of American military aid and intelligence sharing with the Ukrainians, also saw Washington and Kyiv agree to “as soon as possible” conclude a deal to develop and share Ukraine’s critical mineral resources. Following that, as US Secretary of SMarco Rubio put it, the response is up to the Russians and “the ball is now in their court”.

Aside from the negotiations themselves, an equally important factor in such a development was who led those negotiations. The fact that it was Saudi Arabia – along with the US – that was the mediating party further asserted the role of the Gulf kingdom in the potential peace process for Europe’s most deadly war in contemporary times.

In the halls and corridors of international diplomacy, soft power is not only defined by the extent to which a nation can influence another nation or its surrounding region, but in how effectively it can mediate between rival or conflicting states. The bigger the conflict or more wide-ranging its impact, the bigger the score for a state if it can secure its role as a viable and trusted mediator between the opposing sides.

Contrary to the popular perception that large powers are the most viable candidates to serve in such mediatory roles, there are ‘middle powers’ within the international community – those that have reached a stage between developing and developed nations – which are increasingly throwing their diplomatic weight around.

The United States, for example, was perceived to have lost much of its reputation as a viable mediator between Palestine and Israel when it made the controversial decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem back in 2018, and then a year later when it attempted to push its ‘deal of the century’. While claiming to fairly resolve the longstanding dispute, Washington under the first Trump administration only succeeded in further revealing its bias towards Tel Aviv by sidelining the Palestinians and attempting to deprive them of much of their rights.

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Middle powers, however, have been gaining significant ground over the past half a decade, attempting to break into the mediation industry by presenting themselves as neutral players usually retaining adequate relations with both opposing sides at the table.

Think Qatar with its hosting of negotiations over the former war in Afghanistan and the ongoing conflict in Gaza, or Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the Jeddah peace talks between Sudan’s warring sides, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) little-known attempts to mediate between Pakistan and India, or Turkiye’s recent mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia.

And all of those middle powers have set their eyes on the crown jewel of current mediation efforts: Ukraine and Russia. Some have offered to mediate on a lower level, such as the UAE and Qatar having successfully facilitated negotiations for the swapping of prisoners, and even children, between Moscow and Kyiv.

Others, however, have set their sights on a much broader and more ambitious horizon – hosting talks on the securing of peace and ending the three-year-long conflict. In that game, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have emerged as the key players and, in many ways, competitors.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (R) in Lviv, Ukraine on 18 August 2022 [TUR Presidency/Anadolu Agency]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (R) in Lviv, Ukraine on 18 August 2022 [TUR Presidency/Anadolu Agency]

Mediation games

On 18 February, the Saudis hosted Russian and American officials for talks focused on putting an end to the war in Ukraine, in what was the first open and direct and face-to-face communication between the two since Moscow launched its invasion back in 2022.

At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Turkiye for talks with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After learning of the talks in Riyadh, however, that seeming exclusion of the Ukrainian side prompted Zelenskyy to significantly pivot toward Ankara in serving as a mediator for peace talks. In an apparent jab at the US for not inviting him to the table, the embattled Ukrainian leader called for Turkiye to be included in any engagement over Kyiv’s fate.

Days later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Ankara, followed by a gathering in Istanbul of Russian and American officials on 27 February to discuss the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington and the resumption of diplomatic ties.

The incidents of that month presented a seeming back and forth between Saudi Arabia and Turkiye for those diplomatic efforts, leaving the appearance of a soft power competition through the course of mediation.

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and even prior to that, Turkiye had positioned itself as a key figure – and possibly even the most viable figure – suitable for mediation between the two warring sides, balancing its diplomatic ties with both Moscow and Kyiv while gaining the support for mediation efforts from both sides.

It leveraged that position to secure a number of prominent deals in the early months and first year of the war, managing to facilitate the Black Sea grain export deal to ensure that global hunger from the fallout of Ukrainian grain exports did not become a reality. It also dominated the earliest point of negotiations after the outbreak of the war, hosting the ‘Istanbul talks’ in an initial attempt to halt the conflict and come to a political and territorial solution.

Over the past three years, though, the results of Ankara’s efforts have largely fallen apart, with Russia having withdrawn from the Black Sea grain deal in 2023 while the Istanbul talks have been overtaken by other initiatives, including these current Riyadh talks.

READ: Saudi Arabia, Turkiye discuss bilateral defence cooperation

Furthermore, not all players are now on board with Turkish mediation at present, particularly Russia which rejected Ankara’s offer to pick up peace talks last year.

That largely stems from the fact that Turkiye’s involvement in the Ukraine war is a double-edged sword. While Turkish military assistance and the provision of drones to Ukraine helped strengthen Ankara’s rivalry against Moscow on the larger geopolitical stage alongside other fronts such as Libya and Syria, and while Turkiye skillfully navigated diplomatic ties with both Russia and Ukraine, it also inevitably deteriorated the Kremlin’s trust in Turkiye’s claim to being an entirely neutral actor.

Through its sheer geopolitical reality, Turkiye will inevitably always remain a key player in the Black Sea region, and through its current national interests, it will long aim to project its influence across other fronts in its own backyard of the Levant and the Mediterranean regions – putting it at odds with Russia’s own geopolitical interests.

Moscow knows this, and despite being willing to work with Ankara in seeing through diplomatic efforts to an extent, it is hesitant to wholly place its trust in a Turkish initiative.

The US, too, is reluctant to go the Turkish route, with the Trump administration’s special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, saying earlier this month that the Istanbul talks cannot serve as the basis for a Ukraine-Russia peace deal due to its limitations to the situation of the war’s early days.

For now, however, all other key sides of the table involved in Ukraine’s war are seemingly looking towards Saudi Arabia as the most neutral and relevant venue through which to settle the issue. With the US, Russia, and Ukraine all flocking to the Gulf state for the new series of negotiations, they all seemingly accept the kingdom’s mediation and give their blessing to those efforts.

Nevertheless, Turkiye’s aim to expand its diplomatic soft power and mediatory capacity continues. At a parliamentary group meeting for his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on Wednesday, president Erdogan stated that “we are turning Turkiye into a main hub of peace diplomacy, elevating it beyond being a source of stability in its region.”

With soft power competitors like Riyadh, the Gulf states, and other middle powers vying for the same role, Ankara has a long and arduous road ahead in its quest for diplomatic dominance. It has a myriad of other options at its disposal to expand its significance in international diplomacy, however, and it is already likely seeking other avenues to influence a resolution for the Ukraine file.

READ: Turkiye could be a vital partner as Europe and Ukraine seek a new security framework

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.