Complex dynamics hinder Egypt-Syria rapprochement

The relations between Egypt and Syria remain stalled amid caution and anticipation, despite the participation of interim Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in the emergency Arab summit hosted by Cairo earlier this month. The Egyptians have yet to come to terms fully with the sudden shift in the Syrian political landscape — the fall of Bashar Al-Assad, his flight to Moscow, and the opposition coming to power — fourteen years after the Arab Spring first swept through the region.

A breakthrough in bilateral ties appears challenging, given Egypt’s deep-seated security concerns, political reservations and strategic red lines directed at the transitional authority in the new Syria. Cairo has been notably slow in signalling any acceptance or engagement with the new Syrian leadership. On the contrary, Al-Sharaa has faced harsh criticism from pro-government Egyptian media, which labelled him as a “terrorist” and reminded both Egyptian and Syrian audiences repeatedly about Abu Muhammad Al-Julani, the Syrian president’s nom de guerre during his leadership of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham.

Egypt’s hesitation remains evident, as it has yet to send any high-ranking official for formal contacts with Syria’s new leadership since Al-Assad’s ouster on 8 December.

In an interview with Al Arabiya, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty referred to the current Syrian administration as the “de facto authority”. This came before a Turkish-brokered meeting with his Syrian counterpart in Ankara, held on the sidelines of concurrent visits, and attended by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in February.

Two days after Al-Sharaa was appointed interim president, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi posted on social media: “I extend my congratulations to Mr Ahmad Al-Sharaa on assuming the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic during the transitional phase, and I wish him success in fulfilling the aspirations of the Syrian people for greater progress and prosperity.”

However, official displeasure was apparent in the cold reception that Al-Sharaa received upon arrival at Cairo International Airport, where he was met by Egypt’s Minister of Supply Sherif Farouk, ahead of the Arab summit about Gaza reconstruction. Although Al-Sisi held a bilateral meeting with his Syrian counterpart — the first of its kind — it failed to allay deeper concerns and lingering doubts.

Observers note that Al-Sharaa’s invitation to the summit was not Cairo’s choice.

However, it was difficult to overlook without risking tension with Saudi Arabia, Egypt’s ally and the first overseas destination that Al-Sharaa visited in February.

During the meeting, Al-Sisi reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to Syria’s unity and territorial integrity and called for a comprehensive political process that includes all components of Syrian society and excludes no one, according to the Egyptian presidency’s spokesperson. For his part, the Syrian president emphasised his desire to open a new chapter of relations with Arab states, especially Egypt, and expressed readiness to work jointly in ways that serve the interests of both countries.

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Egypt’s diplomacy faces three primary concerns in dealing with post-Assad Syria: the fear of revolutionary fervour spreading to Egypt; the potential hosting of Egyptian opposition figures and fugitives; and the possibility of Syria falling under growing Turkish influence.

These fears intensified following the appearance of Mahmoud Fathy alongside Al-Sharaa. He is an Egyptian sentenced to death for the assassination of former Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat. Moreover, Egyptian dissident Ahmad Al-Mansour appeared in a video calling for the formation of a “January 25 Revolutionaries Movement” aimed at confronting the Egyptian regime and overthrowing Al-Sisi, mirroring Assad’s downfall.

Amid these fears, Egypt also has three primary aspirations: preventing Islamist dominance in Syria’s government; the repatriation of nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees currently in Egypt; and securing a stake in Syria’s post-war reconstruction.

These complex dynamics are unsettling for Egyptian decision-makers, torn between apprehension over Al-Sharaa’s political orientation, growing Gulf engagement with the new Syria, increasing international recognition of the transitional authority and deepening Israeli military involvement on Syrian territory.

Nevertheless, signs of goodwill from Damascus — reflected in the diplomatic tone adopted by Al-Sharaa and his Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani, along with the arrest of Al-Mansour — may help defuse Egyptian concerns and lay the groundwork for a more constructive relationship, based on mutually agreeable terms.

Thus far, Egypt’s approach to Damascus has been exploratory, slow and cautious, and informed heavily by intelligence and security priorities. It appears to be awaiting behind-the-scenes understandings that could shape the framework for relations between a new Islamist-led Syrian regime and an Egyptian government that ousted Islamists in a 2013 military coup.

Cairo seeks to impose clear parameters for engagement, led by three red lines: non-interference in Egypt’s internal affairs, no support for Islamist or jihadist groups, and resistance to falling under Turkish influence.

Egypt is not merely looking for conciliatory rhetoric from Al-Sharaa and his team; it seeks concrete guarantees of power-sharing arrangements that would prevent Islamists from monopolising authority in Damascus, the extradition of individuals wanted by Egyptian authorities, and a denial of any Turkish military foothold in Syria.

It is worth noting that Al-Sharaa had previously called in a 2015 interview with Al Jazeera on the Muslim Brotherhood — designated as a “terrorist” organisation by the Egyptian authorities — to take up arms and overthrow Al-Sisi. This history continues to be a major stumbling block to normalisation.

Cairo still views the Syrian president more as Al-Julani than Al-Sharaa.

That perception is reinforced by attempts by Egyptian opposition groups to capitalise on the Syrian example, raising the spectre of a renewed Arab Spring uprising and drawing lessons from Syria’s experience in toppling Al-Assad.

It is undeniable that Al-Sharaa as an individual does not sit well with Cairo. Like other counter-revolutionary regimes in the region, Al-Sisi harbours deep concerns over any form of Islamist rule, especially in Syria, a country that shares historic ties with Egypt, exemplified by their political union in 1958.

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According to political analyst Mohamed Ismail, Al-Sharaa first faces a daunting task within Syria in order to gain the Syrian people’s trust in his ability to preserve national unity and resist sectarian fragmentation. Should he succeed, Cairo will likely be compelled to take serious steps towards rapprochement. Ismail added that if Al-Sharaa secures full Gulf backing under terms favourable to Gulf capitals, Egypt will likewise be compelled to engage and initiate formal diplomatic exchanges.

However, full and genuine rapprochement between the two regimes will not come easily or swiftly. It will likely face significant obstacles, chief among them the Islamist leanings of the Syrian government, which remains Cairo’s principal concern.

Egyptian political researcher Mohamed Gomaa believes that interests stand in opposition to fears and whichever side prevails will determine the future of relations between the two countries.

In the end, Egypt is in no hurry to pursue this rapprochement, preferring to wait for the completion of Syria’s institutional rebuilding, an assessment of the transitional period’s success, and the new regime’s ability to dispel existing concerns.

More precisely, the Egypt-Syria file will remain, above all, a security and intelligence matter, governed by complex dynamics and narrow political calculations, and shaped by the will of an Egyptian president deeply opposed to both the Arab Spring and the rise of Islamist governance.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.