Beyond the rhetoric: Assessing the IAEA uranium enrichment claims about Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has sounded the alarm about Iran’s nuclear programme; again. Tehran is reportedly just a week away from enriching uranium to 90 per cent, the threshold for weapons-grade material. With Iran ramping up its production from seven kilograms of uranium per month to over 30 kilograms, the trajectory is clear: Tehran is accelerating its nuclear ambitions at an unprecedented pace.

Iran is now the only non-nuclear state to have enriched uranium to such a level, and yet its cooperation with the IAEA has been increasingly shaky. In June 2022, Iran removed critical surveillance equipment from key nuclear sites, including monitors from its Natanz enrichment facility. Without full transparency, the IAEA’s ability to verify Iran’s capabilities is compromised severely. But here’s the real question: What if Iran has already crossed the line? What if the IAEA’s warnings are already outdated, and Tehran has secretly built a nuclear weapon?

Iran continues to be the target of Western criticism over its nuclear programme.

Western powers and the IAEA continue to express their concerns surrounding Iran’s uranium enrichment levels and it being closer to building a bomb. The question surrounding Iran’s possession of nuclear weapon capability remains a relevant part of the global debate. The IAEA claims that Iran has been accelerating its uranium to 60 per cent purity, moving closer to the 90 per cent required for nuclear weapons. According to Rafael Grossi, the director general of the IAEA, Iran initially produced approximately seven kilograms of enriched uranium per month. However, that has increased to over 30 kgs, signalling an evident increase.

While referring to Iran’s uranium enrichment activity, Grossi stated that Iran is “pushing the gas pedal.” The West stands by the argument that no country has increased the levels of enriched uranium to such an extent without developing the weapon, and believes that such high levels are not necessarily required for a civilian programme. Iran, however, is standing its ground as it continues to reject the claims made by the UN nuclear watchdog and the West in general while stressing that its nuclear programme is indeed entirely peaceful and it does not intend to develop weapons.

READ: US seeks direct talks with Iran to push for full dismantling of nuclear program

Tehran was also pressed by the IAEA to allow inspections immediately, which Iran agreed to as it remains firm on its stance that its nuclear programme is peaceful. The IAEA and Western countries adopted a resolution in November denouncing the lack of Iranian cooperation with the agency. In response, Iran announced that it intends to activate “new and advanced” centrifuges. As this resolution faced criticism by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy Organisation, Iran’s nuclear head Mohammad Eslami ordered the launch of three centrifuges. According to the 6 December report of the IAEA, it was confirmed that at Fordow, Iran had begun the operation of two extra cascades of IR-6 centrifuges intending to produce 5 per cent U-235.

Very importantly, the IAEA made a statement that the stockpile of Iran’s enriched uranium has grown to 275kg, equating to roughly one nuclear weapon’s worth each month. Similarly, in its latest report, the IAEA, referring to Iran as the sole country not possessing nuclear weapon capability producing such material, stated that Iran’s increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium is of “serious concern.”

Grossi pointed out that Iran remains a “permanent item” on the IAEA’s agenda.

However, it has also been brought to the world’s attention that the IAEA cannot confirm Iran’s specific actions due to the authorities’ removal of IAEA surveillance equipment. Earlier in 2022, the surveillance equipment of the IAEA was dismantled from certain facilities by Iran in a standoff with the West. In 2023, a small portion of this equipment was reinstalled, as noted by the IAEA. As such, it indicates that the agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s actions remains limited and raises concerns about complete transparency.

The unilateral withdrawal of the United States in 2018 from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, coupled with Iranian noncompliance to the safeguard agreements with the IAEA, makes the situation even more concerning. The IAEA has limited scope to monitor Iranian nuclear facilities, and that depends on the cooperation and will of Iran over how much it allows the agency to do. The most pertinent question arises: if Iran is that close to building a bomb, according to the IAEA, Western media and think tanks, isn’t it possible that Iran has become a latent nuclear power but is not testing weapons yet to avoid violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?

Iran: Direct talks meaningless with those using threats

The IAEA yardstick for building a nuclear bomb is having approximately 42kg of U235 or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The current stockpile of Iranian HEU is 275 kg, and according to that estimate, Iran can build 6.5 nuclear weapons. The rate at which Iran is producing HEU, it could build one nuclear weapon per month. Some nuclear experts argue that it would take anywhere between six months to a year for Iran to build a single nuclear device. While some analysts suggest that those estimates are based on rudimentary or older nuclear weapon technology.

Iran has access to advanced nuclear tech. It can develop a nuclear device in a few weeks if it wants to.

Beyond obtaining fissile materials, developing a nuclear warhead involves several critical steps. This includes converting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into metal and then shaping and machining it to form the bomb’s core. Additionally, various non-nuclear components must be prepared before assembling the warhead. These include the weapon’s design, a neutron initiator, a detonation wave focusing system, high explosives, detonators, and an arming, fusing and firing system. The experience of other nuclear-armed states indicates that these non-nuclear components can be developed alongside nuclear fuel production, meaning that they do not require extra time. Iran’s early weapons designs were similar to major design features of China’s first atomic bomb (coded as device 596 and exploded in 1964) and its first missile warhead (coded as warhead 548 and tested in 1966).

China completed its first batch of weapons-grade HEU in January 1964, just months before conducting its first nuclear test. All non-nuclear components required for the first two bombs were already prepared. At that point, the teams waited for sufficient HEU. Once available, scientists and engineers took one to two weeks to convert UF6 gas into metal and purify it, followed by two to three weeks for metal melting and pit casting. The final bomb core, consisting of two hemispheres, was then fabricated within hours on the morning of 1 May, 1964. China built its first nuclear bomb some 60 years ago when it lacked advanced equipment and nuclear tech. China also built its first nuclear device in peacetime, while Iran is currently in a state of de-facto war with Israel, and it’s almost a race against time for Tehran to build a bomb or get its nuclear facilities destroyed by Israel.

Iran’s nuclear archives seized by Israeli intelligence in 2018 revealed Iran’s “Amad Plan”, code-named for the crash nuclear weapon programme operated from 1999 to 2003. According to this plan, Iran had to build five 10-kiloton (KTN) nuclear bombs along with four deliverable warheads for the Shahab-3 ballistic missile and one warhead for testing underground. An analysis of Iran’s seized nuclear archive concluded that by the end of the Amad Plan in 2003, Iran had made significant advancements in nearly all aspects of nuclear weapon development. This included progress in weapon design, neutron initiator development, detonation wave focusing, cold testing, casting and machining, and the integration of warheads with re-entry vehicles.

IAEA assertions about the Iranian nuclear programme come with their technical and capacity limitations.

The IAEA calls for renewed talks with Iran that should be taken seriously by the European powers and the US, who were part of the previous nuclear deal with Iran. The agency’s Grossi also warned Israel about attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, saying that it would be “very, very serious indeed” in terms of Tehran’s retaliation and the potential spread of radiation.

READ: Iran raises alert level amid fear of war with Israel

According to available data and the past experience of nuclear powers, it is safe to assume that Iran has become a de facto nuclear power by now, and the United States is likely aware of this fact. Israeli calculations about the Iranian nuclear programme are hawkish, and its leaders want to take out Iranian nuclear facilities militarily, but the US is not interested in this misadventure. Washington knows that such an escalation would be a precursor to a regional war. The nuclear weapons programme gives Iran a diplomatic cushion to leverage its bargaining position in any future talks with the US or a possible renewal of the Iranian nuclear deal.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.