King Faisal ‘threatened the US to reuse the oil weapon’ over Israel’s intransigence after the 1973 embargo, UK documents show

King Faisal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud warned the United States that Arab states would use oil as a political weapon once again unless Israel agreed to a settlement with the Arab nations two years after the oil embargo of 1973, British documents reveal.

In response to US and European support for Israel during the 1973 war — launched by Egypt and Syria to reclaim territories occupied by Israel — King Faisal led a coalition of oil-producing nations to impose an embargo on oil exports to pro-Israel countries. The embargo triggered a global energy crisis, especially in Europe, and exposed Western dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources.

After the war, the late US Foreign Secretary Dr Henry Kissinger repeatedly bragged he had succeeded in persuading Arab leaders not to use oil as leverage again.

The Arabs lifted the embargo on 18 March 1974, after some of their demands were addressed. Though Israel did not fully withdraw from territories it occupied in 1967, the embargo linked the Arab-Israeli conflict to US interests in regional oil — an outcome Kissinger had sought to prevent.

In late January 1975, during one of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy missions between Israel and the Arab states, he visited Saudi Arabia. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office documents show that during this visit, King Faisal raised the possibility of reusing oil as a political weapon. Ahmed Zaki Yamani, then Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources, who attended the meeting, was quoted as saying that the king said the Arab world “would unquestionably resort to the oil weapon again unless there was substantial and early progress towards an Arab/Israel settlement.” This statement was apparently a response to British journalist Anthony Sampson’s question about how the meeting went between King Faisal and Kissinger.

                                                      King Faisal’s meeting with Kissinger

Later on the British journalist told Michel Weir, under-secretary with responsibility for Britain’s relations with the Middle East, that he attended a part of the King Faisal-Kissinger talks where “he observed that both men looked unusually sombre”. Despite being unable to hear the conversation between the king and the US secretary, he “deduced that the meeting had not gone well”, Weir said in a memo to Sir D Maitland, British permanent under-secretary.

Sampson confirmed that the Saudis told him later that the king had “indeed made clear his dissatisfaction” with the lack of progress between Israel and its Arab neighbours, Egypt and Syria.

King Faisal’s threat came months after Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy failed to achieve military disengagement between Egypt and Israel. Kissinger blamed Israel’s “unrealistic” demands and its failure to understand Arab positions for the breakdown in talks, which strained relations between Israel and President Gerald Ford’s administration.

During Kissinger’s efforts, King Faisal himself showed flexibility. Although he expressed, in a previous meeting with Kissinger, his belief that Israel “shouldn’t remain in the occupied areas”, he confirmed his “support” for US efforts to “reach a solution in the Middle East”.

                                                      King Faisal’s meeting with Kissinger 2

During his visit to Riyadh, Sampson also spoke with journalists travelling with Kissinger during his six-hour visit to the influential Gulf state. They said Kissinger had, during a briefing aboard his plane, spoken “freely and forcefully” about his determination to “break OPEC (the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and oil prices” — a move Sampson later described as “unwise”.

Kissinger also recalled statements he made during the 1973 embargo suggesting possible US military intervention to secure Middle Eastern oil fields. While he insisted these remarks were intended to “warn” the Arabs, he believed they “had achieved their purpose of making the Arabs think twice before contemplating another oil embargo”. When asked for evidence, he said that there was “no allusion by any Arab to the threat of an oil embargo” during his Middle East trip.

Other documents show King Faisal strongly opposed any attempts by the US or Europe to ease the 1973 embargo. The UK had tried, on behalf of the European Community, to persuade Arab leaders to avoid intensifying the embargo. According to Foreign and Commonwealth Office records, the Qataris told British officials in November 1973 that Faisal “would be tougher than any other Arab head of state.”

Meeting bewteen Qatari Amir and British ambassador

Meeting bewteen Qatari Amir and British ambassador 2

In a meeting on 25 November, the Qatari Emir Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani told the British Ambassador Edward Henderson in “very strict secrecy”  that he “hoped to get help from fellow Gulf leaders particularly Sultan Qaboos ( Of Oman)” not to intensify the use of oil weapon and to ease it.

Sheikh Khalifa also said he would speak “very seriously” to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, whom he expected to be more sympathetic. While the emir expressed his willingness to “do his best with the Saudis” he expressed his concern that this was “where he feared most trouble”.

Sheikh Khalifa told Henderson that King Faisal had warned the US secretary of state that if the issue of Islamic ownership of the Holy sites, including Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, was not resolved in favour of the Arabs, “there would have to be a holy war” which would involve the entire Muslim world against Israel.

According to the same records, Sheikh Khalifa also told Henderson in confidence that Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, then president of the United Arab Emirates, was considering imposing a 25 per cent tax on all oil exports from Arab countries. Sheikh Zayed proposed using the revenue to “buy weapons for the fight against Israel”. However, the Qatari emir believed such a plan  would “infuriate” the world and “damage the Arab cause irretrievably.”

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.