The government in Sudan appears confused and agitated that the UK government has not invited Khartoum to send a representative to a conference about Sudan, but commentators view the British decision as entirely expected and no real surprise. Sudan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Yusuf, criticised the British government approach: “It equates the sovereign Sudanese state — a UN member since 1956 — with a terrorist militia [the Rapid Support Forces – RSF] committing genocide, crimes against humanity and unprecedented atrocities against civilians.”
Following the ouster of the discredited Islamic-orientated government of Omer Al-Bashir in April 2019, the British government made persistent attempts to change the direction of Sudanese governments in its favour. The appointment of Abdullah Hamdok in August 2019 appeared to offer real hope of change. With British think-tanks such as Chatham House advising Hamdok’s government, the first move was to root out endemic corruption and change the direction of the country’s constitution by marginalising the influence of the Islamic elements. The second move was to sideline the influence of the old regime by appointing a committee tasked to dismantle the old government and restructure the financial assets of the army.
Whilst there were substantive groups away from the Islamic movement, particularly among the young, the emergence of an inexperienced left-wing, communist-led political movement in the shape of the Forces of Freedom and Change quickly ran into difficulties. The major problem was the corruption among the committee tasked to stem the Islamic movement and the army’s assets. The second difficulty was the inability to remove the restriction imposed by the signing of the Juba Agreement which gave an Islamic-orientated armed movement a substantive role in the running of the country.
The Army moved to overthrow the transitional arrangement in October 2021. In a series of bizarre revelations, it was disclosed that Hamdok was living in the army’s headquarters and was overthrown with his tacit agreement. The coup was intended to dislodge the leftist elements, but with the reinstallation of the armed Islamic movements and the growing public mistrust of Hamdok’s government, he was forced to resign and leave the prime minister role for a second time in January 2022.
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With the outbreak of the war in April 2023, the British supported Hamdok’s attempt to invite a UN intervention force to separate the army and the RSF and create the “conditions for peace”. Those events were regarded widely with suspicion and Hamdok struggled to appear neutral when links between his movement and the RSF appeared to emerge. Hamdok used the Ethiopian capital as a meeting point of his movement, arguably in an attempt to distance himself from his home base or links with the UAE.
The British government failed to manoeuvre its chosen candidate into power.
It must now find a different diplomatic front to keep the UK’s historical ties and influence in Sudan alive. Hence, under the notion that the absence of an invitation to the Sudan government is a mark of neutrality, the UK government has needed to regroup. The split of Hamdok’s Tagadam movement, caused by elements of his group supporting a breakaway Sudanese government, means that the battle lines are due to be redrawn.
Moreover, with the ICJ due to begin its consideration of the allegation by Sudan against the UAE’s “complicity in genocide” by supporting the RSF, the British government must launch some sort of diplomatic charm offensive to neutralise the claim that the UAE has armed the RSF in direct opposition to the Sudan government. Furthermore, with Kenya now facing a boycott of its products, including tea, by the government in Khartoum, while also being invited to the Sudan conference, the UK appears to be encouraging a new approach to cajole Sudan to fall into line.
It is clear that the UK and its allies are going to emphasise the interest of the Sudanese people and downplay the demands of the Sudanese government in order to suggest that the interests of the two are not the same. The new strategy may be a repeat performance of attempts to draw out another political arrangement that will fall short of allowing the people of Sudan to choose their leaders through the ballot box.
Emphasis on civilian freedom, democracy and leadership free of the army control is also expected to be a theme.
The equivalence of the RSF with the Sudanese army and the need to enter into negotiations to end the war may remain a demand completely out of step with public opinion in Sudan. Offers of help to the country are likely to be conditional, with promises of support but no immediate provision of financial assistance.
Ahead of the conference in London on 15 April, the situation in Sudan is changing fast following the liberation of Khartoum, Al Jazira and Sennar. According to the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), some 400,000 people have returned in the past three months, including 72,039 from Egypt alone. Civil society NGOs have already stepped up their assistance by offering local help. The situation with famine and food scarcity is undoubtedly going to change in most of the country controlled by the Sudanese government. The repair of the electronic banking system will also aid external transfers and increase the availability of hard cash, which will help to re-establish regular weekly markets across the liberated areas.
Observers believe that establishing Western international support or encouraging long term investment may become difficult, especially if Sudan agrees to take Russia’s offer to establish a military base in the Red Sea or Sudan realigns its traditional allegiance with the Arab world away from normalisation with the Zionist state of Israel.
Regardless of the outcome of the London conference, though, Sudan can only expect a steep upward curve on the way to rebuilding the country. The challenges are not only political or infrastructural. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Sudan does not need a formal conference invitation per se. For Sudan and its people, the most important offer will be help to fulfil its need for security, stability and continued sustainable investment.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.