What does the Trump administration want from Damascus?

Following US President Donald Trump’s administration’s decision to change the status of Syrian diplomats at the UN mission, which involved the US not recognising the new Syrian administration, a question comes to mind: What does the Trump administration want from Damascus? Is it using non-recognition as a bargaining chip to manipulate Damascus, and perhaps its regional and international backers?

The US administration’s decision can be described as largely technical, meaning it is bureaucratic in nature, not political. For example, the decision to change the visa type is based on an internal assessment that classifies the interim transitional government in Syria as an extension of structures unacceptable to the US, specifically in terms of its alleged ties to factions designated as terrorist organisations. Its technical nature is confirmed by the fact that it is issued by institutions of a technical, rather than political, nature, such as the Department of Homeland Security.

However, this does not mean that the decision has no political implications, and it indicates that lifting the sanctions is not on the Trump administration’s agenda. There is a possibility that the Trump administration will reconsider the US Treasury Department’s decision under the Biden administration, which stipulated a six-month relief of the sanctions, which could be extended. This means that the road to Syria’s exit from its economic crisis is still long, given that the US role in this area is crucial, and that these policies may push many countries to change their approach to relations with Damascus out of fear of being affected by US sanctions.

What is interesting about American policy is that, even at the height of its conflict with Iran, Russia and the Assad regime, and while leading an international coalition through the Military Operations Centre (MOC) offices in Turkiye and Jordan, it did not go so far as to withdraw recognition of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, and neither the status nor privileges of Syrian diplomats at the UN mission in New York were affected. Furthermore, the new government in Damascus enjoys de facto legitimacy, a legitimacy based on which most countries in the South were able to integrate themselves seamlessly into the international system without any problems or complications. Furthermore, the removal of the Assad regime entailed geopolitical changes that served Washington’s interests, as part of its efforts to weaken Iranian influence in the region.

Trump: You Gotta be reasonable, Bibi

Various assessments and analyses of the American position suggest that Washington is still evaluating the new administration in Damascus to reach an arrangement for dealing with this administration, which is primarily composed of Islamist groups led by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, which Washington classifies as a “terrorist organisation.” However, this new Syrian administration is attempting to formulate a moderate governing system an Islamic nature, similar to those in Turkiye and Malaysia, to gain the approval of the outside world. Yet, American political behaviour remains cautious in dealing with this new regime, with responses ranging from placing it under observation to testing it through a list of conditions presented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Levant and Syria Affairs, Natasha Franceschi, to Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad Al-Shaibani, on the sidelines of the donors’ conference. Furthermore, the Trump administration is witnessing a difference in views between the State Department and the White House on the nature of dealing with Damascus. It appears that the White House (which is home to many pro-Israel supporters) remains the most effective in determining the form of policies to be adopted toward Damascus.

Despite this, the Trump administration’s policy remains largely unclear and vague. There is no clear negative position toward the policies of the new Syrian administration, which has expressed its willingness to cooperate on issues of concern to Washington, particularly the fight against the Islamic State (Daesh) and the issue of chemical weapons. The US administration does not appear to be particularly concerned with the issue of minorities, especially since President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s administration is working diligently to accommodate Christians, who are the Trump administration’s primary concern. The rest of the components are a given for Washington. The Trump administration has hinted at its relative satisfaction with the Sharaa administration’s measures regarding the constitutional declaration and government formation or at least has not expressed explicit objection to these measures.

This means that the Trump administration is not interested in the specifics of Syria itself, nor in the nature of policies pursued by the Sharaa administration, reflecting the unimportance of Syria to the Trump administration, especially after Iran’s withdrawal and Russia’s weakening. Consequently, the strategic status (already low in the Trump administration’s opinion) has declined to a minimum, placing Syria outside the Trump administration’s priorities, demoting it to a neglected file. Its affairs may be entrusted to regional and international actors in the coming period given growing indications of a US withdrawal from Syria, which is no longer a possibility but has entered the implementation phase through the successive gradual withdrawals of US forces from eastern Syria.

The Trump administration will likely not have a specific policy on Syria in the coming period, nor will it invest diplomatically in Syria. It is likely to pursue a policy of managing the situation through low-level diplomacy to manage the relationship between Turkiye and Israel. In the best-case scenario, it will turn Syria into a bargaining chip for regional parties seeking to benefit from the Syrian dynamic, especially since they possess the tools capable of paralysing Syria: US sanctions, the continuity of which would hinder any ability to emerge from fragility and danger.

This article first appeared in Arabic in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on 10 April 2025

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.