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Is the US willing to favour Turkiye over Israel in Syria?

April 15, 2025 at 11:00 am

President of Turkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and U.S. President Donald Trump hold a joint press conference following their meeting at the White House in Washington, United States on November 13, 2019 [Halil Sagirkaya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images]

As US president Donald Trump sat with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the White House earlier this month, the Israeli leader looked visibly uncomfortable and discontented, exchanging glances with his delegation as Trump expressed his views surrounding the growing rivalry between Israel and Turkiye in Syria. It was the second time within the past few months that Netanyahu had that look; the first was when Trump stunned him by announcing a proposal for America to “take over” the Gaza Strip. This time, there was good reason why the Israeli premier exuded open frustration.

Responding to a question about his administration’s stance towards Turkiye’s role in Syria, Trump hailed his “great relations” with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saying that he’s “a tough guy, and he’s very smart, and he did something that nobody was able to do” by helping former Syrian rebels overthrow the Assad regime on 8 December last year.

Trump then turned to Netanyahu sitting beside him and addressed the issue of the growing rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv in Syria, telling the Israeli premier that “if you have a problem with Turkiye, I really think you’re going to be able to work it out. You know, I have a very, very good relationship with Turkiye and with their leader, and I think we’ll be able to work it out. So, I hope that’s not going to be a problem. I don’t think it will be a problem.”

The US president continued by insisting that “any problem that you have with Turkiye, I think I can solve,” telling the Israeli leader to “be reasonable. We have to be reasonable.”

READ: Turkiye slams Israel ministers’ ‘aggressive and expansionist’ remarks

Over the past four months, Syria has been bombed by Israel on a frequent basis, even more than was the case during the Assad era. The first month of such strikes were apparently carried out to destroy Syria’s military capabilities and prevent arms falling into the hands of the new Syrian forces — distrusted as “Islamists” by the Israeli leadership and many of its allies in the West — but the air strikes have only increased since then.

This month, Israel finally admitted what many already knew to be the case: it fears the presence of Turkish influence and forces within Syria, viewing Ankara as the major threat next door.

According to one senior Israeli official cited by Kan News, recent air strikes in Syria destroyed the T4 airbase in Homs province following a visit by Turkish military teams who reportedly evaluated it as a potential facility to be part of a Turkish-Syrian defence agreement. That move was conducted with the aim of preventing the overall establishment of Turkish air and naval bases in Syria, with the Israeli official saying that it is a red line which Tel Aviv would enforce if Ankara were to encroach on it.

Aside from direct action against potential Turkish military capabilities in Syria, Israel has also been working on the diplomatic front to blunt any edge that Turkish forces could have in the country and the wider region. This is being seen in Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to lobby US Secretary of State Marco Rubio against any potential sale of F-35 fighter jets to Turkiye.

Ankara is, of course, pushing back against that sabotage, offering to purchase $20 million worth of ammunition, electronics and parts from the US if the Trump administration were to lift sanctions from Turkiye and readmit it to the F-35 programme.

The battleground between Turkiye and Israel within their mutual neighbour is far from being theoretical. It is a geopolitical reality that Ankara in particular must contend with.

Both states have, until now, insisted that they do not want confrontation, but Tel Aviv is certainly being the more aggressive of the two while there is as yet no sign that Ankara is seeking any such proxy face-off in Syria.

READ: Israel lobbying US to retain Russia’s presence in Syria to counter Turkiye’s influence

And it is that dynamic which is possibly being seen even by US President Trump. His exchange with Netanyahu seemed to give additional credence to the view that the two leaders harbour significant disagreements, and that Trump’s relationship with Netanyahu is deteriorating slowly but surely.

Those within Trump’s inner circle in an advisory capacity know that the president is increasingly frustrated with Netanyahu and the Israeli government’s unwillingness to be flexible on the diplomatic and military fronts. Trump is even reported to prefer the likes of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas over the Israeli leadership.

His relationship with Israel is, therefore, reportedly a necessity based on the pro-Israel lobby’s support for Trump’s election campaign.

In comparison, the US president’s relationship with his Turkish counterpart Erdogan shows signs of flourishing, with the two reportedly planning to meet in coming weeks. That is not only a result of their famously cordial meetings and their respect for each other as strongmen, but also because both leaders and their administrations seem to perceive each other as mutually beneficial, both in terms of bilateral relations and their cooperation in the Middle East. Ankara has also appeared to be largely immune to the ongoing shake-up and shockwaves that Trump is pounding foreign markets with through his threats of tariffs and trade wars.

If the Turkish leadership continues to play its cards right by securing the goodwill of the US president while downplaying any feud with Israel in Syria and the Levant, we may indeed witness a shift in America’s foreign policy in the region. And this could well be at Tel Aviv’s expense.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.