Saddam ‘used’ Jordan’s King Hussein against Egypt ahead of Kuwait invasion, UK documents show

Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak informed the UK that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein “used” King Hussein of Jordan to persuade Egypt to join a trilateral military force to intervene in the Gulf a year before Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, newly found British documents reveal.

The documents, unearthed by MEMO in the UK’s National Archives, also show that the Egyptian president claimed Saddam tried to bribe him into supporting Iraq’s stance against Kuwait.

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait and occupied it for about seven months. Saddam’s objectives included gaining control of Kuwait’s vast oil reserves, cancelling Iraq’s debt to Kuwait, and expanding regional power. On 24 February 1991, a US-led coalition launched a military operation that expelled all Iraqi forces from Kuwait within four days.

In mid-October 1990, about five weeks after the invasion, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd visited Egypt and Israel to explore options to deal with the crisis. During his meeting with Hurd, Mubarak described King Hussein as “Saddam’s cat’s paw,” saying the Iraqi president had “used Hussein against Egypt.”

According to records of that meeting, Mubarak recalled that in 1988 — two years before the invasion — King Hussein, “acting at Saddam’s behest, tried to inveigle Egypt into a united Egypt/Jordan/Iraq military force which could be used for intervention in the Gulf if that proved necessary.” Mubarak warned that such a move “would worry Syria”.

Mubarak stated that King Hussein “lied” when asked whether Gulf States supported the proposed joint military force. Hussein “claimed that the Gulf countries had been consulted and were content,” something Mubarak later found to be “completely untrue.”

The Egyptian president believed Saddam had orchestrated the entire scheme hoping that “he would one day be able to annex Kuwait.” Mubarak said he refused to be involved, stating that his decision was “a matter of principle”.

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According to Mubarak, efforts to pull Egypt into the alliance didn’t end there. The Iraqi and Jordanian leaders also tried to “enmesh” Egypt through the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), established on 16 February 1989, when leaders of Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and North Yemen met in Baghdad. The official aim of the ACC was economic integration — boosting trade, tourism, investment and technical cooperation. But it also had military and political objectives.

In his speech at the ACC’s founding summit, Saddam emphasised the need for militarily strong nations to be prepared to defend other Arab states. Dr. Osama Al-Baz, Mubarak’s political advisor, later clarified that military cooperation was one of the bloc’s core principles to confront the threats or aggression.

Mubarak told Hurd that he had “absolutely refused” to sign “agreements for trilateral military or intelligence cooperation”. When King Hussein presented the idea, Mubarak made it clear that “Egypt would never agree on such arrangements.” Hussein, Mubarak alleged, had falsely claimed that Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd supported the plan.

However, when Mubarak raised the matter with King Fahd, the Saudi monarch denied any such conversation. Fahd was reportedly “very upset by Hussein’s deception.”

Just days before the invasion, on 24 July 1990, Mubarak travelled to Baghdad to mediate the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. He later told Hurd that Saddam “deceived” him; assuring him he had no intention of invading Kuwait. When asked about military movements near the border, Saddam claimed they “were designed only to frighten the Kuwaitis” and said Iraq was “willing to negotiate”. Mubarak called this “a big fat lie.”

Following this conversation with Saddam, Mubarak visited Kuwait and advised its leaders that they “would have to make some concessions” to Iraq. The Kuwaitis refused, insisting they “had already given Iraq with $14 billion in support” and Iraq “had had free run of Kuwaiti facilities” during the Iran-Iraq War. They warned that once they started to pay more to Saddam, he “would never stop”.

Immediately after the invasion, King Hussein visited Egypt in an attempt to “implore” Mubarak not to issue a condemnation of the Iraqi move, arguing that more time was needed to reach a solution. Mubarak agreed to delay a statement of condemnation for only 24 hours and proposed a “limited Arab summit” in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on the condition that Saddam “privately agree to withdraw from Kuwait” and “restore the (Kuwaiti) legitimate government”.

When King Hussein later phoned Mubarak from Baghdad informing him that Saddam “wanted the summit to proceed”, the Egyptian president asked whether he had conveyed the two conditions. Hussein admitted he had not. Mubarak responded that Egyptian public opinion “would not allow him to remain silent any longer.” He later issued a formal condemnation of Iraq’s invasion. The Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (then Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation) soon followed suit.

At the Arab League summit in Cairo on 10 August 1990, a narrow vote approved the deployment of Egyptian, Syrian and Moroccan troops to support Kuwait.

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Mubarak also told Hurd that King Hussein had launched “a public campaign of insults and lies” against him and his country. According to Mubarak, Hussein “claimed that King Hassan [of Morocco] told him that Egypt was undermining Jordan, both politically and economically.” Mubarak was further upset at Queen Noor, Hussein’s wife “snubbed” Suzanne, Mubarak’s wife.

Mubarak suspected that King Hussein “knew about the invasion of Kuwait in advance” and “had been promised help” by Saddam.

He added that when he “resisted Hussein’s blandishments”, Saddam used Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to try to “bribe” Egypt.

Saleh “whispered in Mubarak’s ear” that Saddam “would cancel Egypt’s debts to Kuwait” if Cairo sided with Iraq. Mubarak replied that “everyone knew that there was no question of Egypt ever repaying these debts to Kuwait.”  Saleh asked, “Would $20 billion be enough to get Egypt on side?” Mubarak answered sarcastically: “Give me the money and then I’ll tell you.”

Mubarak and Hurd also discussed possible solutions to the crisis. When asked whether Saddam should be forcibly removed from Kuwait, Mubarak said Saddam was “in a tight corner”, noting that the Iraq military was very weak, depleted “all Iraq’s reserves” in the war with Iran, and  the Iraqi debts  reached $60–70 billion.

He predicted Saddam would face domestic backlash if he left Kuwaiti territories, saying, “Having sold out on Iran, his people would kill him if withdrew from Kuwait.”

When Hurd asked him, Mubarak dismissed any idea of a partial withdrawal, insisting it “must be complete”. He stressed the importance of maintaining tight sanctions on Iraq and predicted the Iraqi army “would run away” once military action to expel it from Kuwait began.

Mubarak also criticised Iraq’s large but ineffective air force, saying it was “badly led”. He added  that if he had such an air force, he “could have won” the war against Iran “in a month”.

Part of Hurd’s Middle East visit included evaluating possible successors to Saddam. Mubarak described the Iraqi leader as “a madman” who was “getting madder by the day,” noting that Saddam had started calling himself by 99 names — those of God. Mubarak concluded: “Even if he is replaced by another madman, at least it will be a new madman.”

In a meeting with UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in May 1990 — three months before the invasion — Thatcher asked Mubarak whether Saddam aspired to be the leader of the Arab world. Mubarak “firmly” replied, “He won’t get it,” according to official notes.

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