Turkey and the move away from US security strategies

The Trump administration has begun preparing a US strategy for the period following the end of the war with Iran, intended to guide its Middle East policy during the final two years of Trump’s term. US sources have outlined several principal directions under consideration. The first, and most important, is the creation of a regional alignment among US allies to contain Iran, with the United States acting as its guarantor. The second, which is structurally linked to the first, is the expansion of the Abraham Accords and normalisation between Israel and countries in the region, foremost among them Saudi Arabia. On the other side, countries in the region appear to be exploring entirely contradictory strategies, mindful of the transformations brought about by Israel’s war on Gaza three years ago and the unjustified war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran several months ago. The Mecca Collective Security Agreement, which brings together Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, likewise reflects this vision, which runs counter to the one being charted by Washington. Last Monday, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, likewise argued that “strategic autonomy is not merely a slogan, but a rational political choice” dictated by considerations of security and national interest. Two months earlier, Majed Al Ansari, adviser to the Qatari prime minister and official spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, justified this strategic autonomy by arguing that global developments require “a more comprehensive approach”. These statements also converged with Egyptian positions. In March, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty affirmed that his country was working to revive and activate the concept of Arab national security, and again raised the idea of a joint Arab force, arguing that any regional security arrangements imposed by external actors were unacceptable.

At the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that the organisation should build an environment of “common security”, and that “external forces” must be prevented from interfering in internal affairs and undermining regional stability. Yesterday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined his country’s vision for a regional security system in the Gulf, reviving a Russian proposal first put forward two decades ago that envisages bringing the Gulf states and Iran together within a regional security framework as a means of addressing mutual concerns and implementing confidence-building measures.

Following the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not rule out joining the organisation, alongside China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and other states. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are also associated with the organisation as dialogue partners. Days ago, steps began in Istanbul to transform the Mecca Agreement from a defence pact on paper into institutions and implementation mechanisms. A secretariat was established, while the Political and Strategic Defence Committee was activated as the highest leadership body responsible for directing joint strategic activities, alongside the activation of channels for operational cooperation. This article examines the extent to which Turkey’s current regional strategy aligns with Washington’s plans for it. It argues that Turkey is pursuing a strategy that contradicts the one being formulated by Washington and converges with a broader vision being adopted by countries across the region, including US allies.

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Turkey’s policy in the region, as one of the three members of the collective security alliance alongside Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, appears to be taking shape and maturing away from Washington’s ambitions and strategies for the region. In fact, this Turkish approach is not linked solely to the developments arising from the recent wars in Gaza and Iran, but reflects a deeper evolution, shaped by a long experience of alliance with the United States and the West.

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Turkish Republic, founded in 1923, aligned itself with the West, following a decision adopted by Kemal Ataturk. During the Cold War, Turkey joined NATO, contributed to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, and became part of the US containment system directed against the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, Turkey suffered its first setback at the hands of the West, when the United States warned it against using American weapons in its crisis with Cyprus. Nor was NATO expected to intervene to protect Turkey in the event of Soviet intervention against it in the context of the same crisis. That episode became one of the principal catalysts for Turkey’s decision to develop its own military industries, particularly after the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in the following decade amid further developments in the same crisis. Although it remained Western-oriented, Turkey during this period joined the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 1969 and adopted a position on the Palestinian question that was closer to the prevailing Arab outlook. In the 1980s, Turkey adopted a strategy based on economic and commercial openness, which led it to turn increasingly towards the Middle East and Asia, while maintaining a foreign policy strategy strongly tied to the West, the United States and Israel. This period also saw Turkey side with the United States in the coalition against Iraq during the Gulf War of 1990–1991.

With the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s emergence at the forefront of the political scene at the beginning of the new millennium, a clearer and more consistent Turkish strategic vision began to take shape, embodied in what former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu described as “strategic depth”. Through this vision, Turkey came to see itself as a geographically central state with historical depth and a civilisational, cultural and religious standing that reinforced its ties to the Middle East. At the same time, Turkey, within this strategy, did not overlook the political and security experience it had accumulated through decades of partnership with the West.

Despite the centrality of its military role within NATO, European states belonging to the European Union have for decades rejected Turkey’s accession to the bloc, and continue to do so today. At the beginning of this period, Turkey demonstrated autonomy in its decision-making from the United States and the Western vision, most notably in 2003, when it refused a US request to allow its territory to serve as a northern front for the invasion of Iraq.

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Turkey adopted a range of policies in the Middle East in line with its “strategic depth” strategy, responding to the region’s rapidly shifting dynamics. It initially pursued a “zero problems” policy with the countries of the region, focusing on economic expansion and deepening friendly political ties. It sought to balance the region’s contradictions, playing a mediating role between Syria and Israel and in the Iranian nuclear file, while maintaining relations with both Hamas and Israel at the same time. The Arab (spring) uprisings, however, forced Turkey to abandon its “zero problems” policy and become involved in the region’s conflicts, after it had itself become a party to several of them, given the region’s central importance to Turkey, the need to preserve its interests there and to protect its border security. Turkey’s deeper involvement in the region revealed new realities and reaffirmed earlier ones, particularly in its relations with the United States, Israel and Europe. Interests collided in Syria, where the United States supported the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey regards as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an organisation hostile to Turkey. Turkish and Israeli interests and policies also clashed there.

Deals involving the sale of advanced weapons and the transfer of US and Western military technology to Turkey were disrupted during the Syrian crisis. The United States and other NATO allies even withdrew their Patriot missile defence systems from Turkey. Turkey turned to Russia to acquire its S-400 air defence system, provoking the ire of Washington and its European allies and further shaping Turkey’s character as a state increasingly independent of Western decision-making.

During this period, Turkey adopted the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, a maritime geopolitical vision centred on Turkey’s rights and sovereignty, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea, with the development of its naval defence capabilities serving as one of the means of implementing it. Turkey confronted the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli alliance against it. Today it remains committed to its “Century of Turkey” vision, within which it sees itself as an independent pole in a multipolar international system. This helps explain Turkey’s policies of maintaining its relationship with the United States and its position within NATO, while developing strategic political and military relations with Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf states despite the contradictions among them. It also explains why Turkey’s move to forge a security and defence alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not a transient step linked to the course or developments of the current war, but rather reflects a deep strategic vision that has evolved through experience and over time. This represents an important experience for the countries of the region, concerning the risks of relying on the United States and on alliances it constructs in accordance with its own interests, risks that have begun to reveal themselves to these countries amid the wars that Washington supports or wages against the peoples and states of the region.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.