The re-engagement of Anatolia with the Levant

The relationship between Turkiye and Syria is like a dense tapestry woven with threads of imperial legacy, ideological divergence and strategic recalibration. From the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516 to the 21st-century refugee crisis, the story is not merely one of borders and treaties, but also of civilisational crossroads and shifting identities.

For more than four centuries, Syria existed as an essential component of the Ottoman Empire. The collapse of the empire following World War I together with the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye in 1923 triggered a defining shift in both Turkish identity and foreign policy. With Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s secular and Western-oriented state vision, Turkiye distanced itself from the Arab world. In his book, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, historian Ilber Ortayli explains that Turkiye’s separation from Arab provinces resulted in both territorial losses and cultural as well as ideological detachment (Ortayli, 2007, p132).

The issue of Hatay crystallised early tensions. After intense Turkish lobbying and a controversial 1939 referendum that was regarded widely as neither free nor fair, Hatay broke away from the French Mandate of Syria to join Turkiye.

The leadership of Syria continues to reject the loss of Hatay despite its official status as part of Turkiye.

According to Raymond Hinnebusch and Ozlem Tur in Turkiye–Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity, the Hatay question created a deep national psychological wound for Syria that has resulted in enduring mistrust (Hinnebusch & Tur, 2013, p47).

The ideological conflict during the Cold War expanded the division between nations. Turkiye became a member of NATO in 1952 while Syria pursued an alliance with the Soviet Union following the adoption of the Ba’athist ideology by Damascus. The Cold War alliances between Turkiye and Syria emerged as points of contention when they clashed over water rights from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and Syria’s aid to the PKK during the 1990s. Turkiye’s military threat in 1998 led to the Adana Agreement that forced Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and define the PKK as a terrorist organisation.

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The Turkish-Syrian partnership entered a brief “golden period” during the 2000s. The introduction of visa-free travel together with joint cabinet meetings and economic accords indicated a strategic thaw between the nations. Turkiye’s then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan holidayed with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. The Syrian Civil War which started in 2011 led to the dissolution of Turkish-Syrian cooperation. Turkiye joined opposition forces and called for the ousting of Assad.

In 2021, Turkiye became the largest refugee-hosting nation in the world, with 3.7 million Syrian refugees on its territory according to UNHCR. A policy of “ansar” (hospitality for fellow Muslims following Prophet Muhammad’s example, peace be upon him) initially accepted the refugees, but economic strain and social integration challenges sparked public resentment. According to a 2020 KONDA survey, 70 per cent of Turkish citizens expressed support for policies to limit or stop accepting refugees. The refugee debate has become a divisive electoral topic because of increasing nationalism and economic downturns.

As President of the Republic, Erdogan has reported that Turkiye has allocated more than $40 billion toward refugee assistance (Anadolu Agency, 2020). The assistance from international organisations remains minimal since EU-Turkiye migration deals from 2016 delivered €6bn, which represents only a small part of the total required support.

Ankara directed its military operations in Syria such as Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Operation Olive Branch (2018) and Operation Peace Spring (2019) to create buffer zones against Kurdish militias which it identifies as PKK extensions. These interventions also served to enable the “voluntary return” of Syrian refugees. The Turkish authorities announced in 2023 that more than 600,000 refugees had returned to northern Syria (TRT World, 2023), yet human rights organisations questioned the true voluntary nature and safety conditions for those who went back to Syria.

Turkiye’s current regional posture reflects a broader existential tension.

It faces the challenge of integrating its Ottoman-Islamic past with its modern secular republican principles. Observers clearly notice Erdogan’s rising focus on Ottoman symbolism as demonstrated through his political language and architectural endeavours. According to many observers, his foreign policy represents a neo-Ottoman resurgence which seeks to establish Turkiye as a moral leader in the Muslim world. Such observations aim to show a neo-Ottoman country in a bad way as they are against the union of the region. They use the term “neo-Ottoman” in a negative way.

Nevertheless, Turkiye’s historical legacy enables it to interact with the Middle East as a returning native power, according to Ahmet Davoutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” writings while he served as the country’s foreign minister and developed the “zero problems with neighbours” policy (Davutoglu 2001:95).

Turkiye’s return to the region has encountered numerous obstacles and challenges. Syria’s view of Turkiye is influenced heavily by a history of imperial control which generates persistent suspicion. Ankara needs to tread carefully between its cultural bonds and its regional ambitions.

The re-engagement of Anatolia with the Levant occurs as equal neighbours whose shared past and present challenges shape the relationship. Indeed, the relationship between Turkiye and Syria encompasses more than conflict because it requires a strategic balance between historical legacy and future prospects alongside identity and national interests. The direction of Turkiye’s future involvement — whether through compassion, caution or calculation — will define the unfolding narrative as regional power dynamics evolve.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.